Reply to SirIsaac787:
"What about the statement "because of the infinite variety of possible emergency situations, specific procedures cannot be prescribed" is nonsense? That seems pretty damn true to me. It is IMPOSSIBLE to train for every single emergency scenario that a controller may face because there are an infinite number of variables to any emergency situation that can make every single one a controller faces much different from the others they have faced."
I'm referring to
the pattern of never-ending VFR into IMC incidents. There were many telling clues in this case given by this pilot that the controller missed (
NOT the controller's fault):
"get over to their area...clear the clouds" (01:10)
"any idea...bottoms of those clouds are ?" (01:28)
"deviate...around these" (01:44)
"keep chasing...clouds..." (02:28)
and how does the controller respond to all of that ? by offering IFR service. That may be the right thing to do in the name of good intentions; However, it is
precisely the
wrong thing to do without considering
the results of that effort under the circumstances.
"But that doesn't mean the ATO is just giving up when it comes to emergency training and saying, "to hell with it, let the controllers figure it out when they experience it." Controllers still run simulation problems with emergencies that they have to handle well to pass training. Of course, what simulated emergencies each controller experiences during training will vary from facility to facility, depending on what that facility deems to be most important for that controller to see an example of (assuming it all meets the standards set by the national training order). So whether or not VFR-into-IFR is a scenario controllers experience in training is up to each facility."
The only standing order addressing front line controller procedure is the 7110.65
LTAs (letters to airmen), LOAs (letters of agreement), FDs (facility directives), etc. are all secondary to the ATC "BIBLE". Every Radar Controller in every Center, TRACON or RAPCON, coast to coast, border to border is trained to that standard. The ATO's philosophy is
reactive. That is old school. That is
NOT adjusting to the reality of consistent incident data. Many policies in that book are years and in some cases
decades old. The FAA is
notorious for acknowledging and refusing to implement NTSB recommendations. Learning how to
recognize and
preempt VFR into IMC is
NOT rocket science. It will simply take the commitment of the policy decision makers to create and settle on the procedure just like any other procedure that finds its way into that book.
"Personally, I believe it is extremely valuable for controllers to experience it and learn some examples of ways to help a pilot. But again, each VFR-into-IFR real-world emergency is NOT the same and so it would in fact be impossible to designate specific procedures a controller should follow in EVERY VFR-into-IFR."
I do
NOT agree. The
RED flags are always the same. A VFR pilot receiving flight-following always starts out in the clear and then gets himself into trouble right under the nose of the controller. That pilot is going to see what he is about to get himself into before he actually does. Unless he is completely silent, (they never are) there will always be some hint over the radio about the developing (and deteriorating) situation.
"Also, what exactly could the controller have done in this situation to better help this pilot? He cannot see what he cannot see nor does he know what training the pilot has received or what equipment he is dealing with (aside from the basics that can be ascertained a potential filed flight plan). It shouldn't be on controllers to obtain from a pilot whether or not they can accept an IFR clearance."
10−2−8. RADAR ASSISTANCE TO VFR AIRCRAFT IN WEATHER DIFFICULTYa. If a VFR aircraft requests radar assistance when it encounters or is about to encounter IFR weather conditions, ask the pilot if he/she is qualified for and capable of conducting IFR flight.
This is the existing
REACTIVE procedure. Better than nothing, I suppose, but practically speaking; The airplane could be inverted long before the controller can ask the question. A
PROACTIVE procedure my look something like this:
a. When, in your best judgment, based upon a VFR pilot's statements, questions, phraseology and/or observed aircraft maneuvers that pilot appears uncertain, disorganized, in denial or in fear of his flying environment; Aggressively query the pilot:
PHRASEOLOGY−SAY YOUR FLIGHT CONDITIONS
ARE YOU INSTRUMENT EQUIPPED AND QUALIFIED ?
SAY INTENTIONSNOTE−NEVER offer unsolicited IFR service to ANY pilot !!!
Offer unsolicited vectors away from all observed and reported (pirep) conditions known to be less than VFR. It is essential to get that pilot's mindset refocused on controlling that aircraft before a potentially deadly situation becomes fatal. "Controllers are not the regulating body. It should not be up to them to make sure a pilot is capable of IFR flight. That is on the pilot."
All controllers have better things to do than to save a pilot from himself. That does not change the fact that human beings with the means to fly themselves and their spouses and their children off of the ground often suffer from an
arrogant sense of entitlement. Who among us has not felt so compelled to achieve a goal as to skew our better judgment in the process ? This controller
REACTED to the situation as he was trained. The controller was
NOT provided with the mandate to act
PROACTIVELY.
"If they do not receive the specific training on how to avoid IFR flight and not accept an IFR clearance if they are not capable, then that is something that needs to be address with pilot training standards."
That is something that needs to be addressed by CFIs & DPEs. It is the CFI that signs off the student to solo, solo XC, take a Practical Test, complete a Flight Review or IPC, fly tailwheel, complex, high performance, high altitude, tow gliders, WINGS program etc. The CFI's recommendation and signature is his endorsement of that pilot candidate's demonstrated performance and judgment. The risk of liability to a CFI has never been greater and it is only getting worse.
It is the DPE who is confirming the competence of the CFI as well as testing the pilot candidate.
Again, all the controllers can do is act based on what limited information they have sitting at their radar scope. The weather depictions they see on their scope are precip only and that isn't entirely accurate.
Don't forget about pireps. It would appear this pilot and controller had a lot to work with.
And in this case, the pireps the controller received were 30+ miles from this accident aircraft's position. The weather can be quite different between those two aircraft and there could have been a hole or way for the pilot to remain VFR, as indicated by him saying he was deviating to the south to "chase the clouds."
Do you drive your car
defensively ? There were enough
RED flags in those pireps, known wx and incident pilot's comments for a properly trained controller to
aggressively get
proactive with this pilot and query for the facts...FAST !!! That did
NOT happen because the controller is not trained to do so. You will recall the unsolicited vector to BFL came
after the Mayday call and not
before. There is no harm in reminding a pilot
suspected of pushing his limits of his available options. Unfortunately, this type of pilot adds to the controller's workload.
"...it seems to me the controller was simply trying to be helpful by offering an IFR clearance..."
No doubt. Scenario based training is the study of
the results as well as the effort. The ATO figured out a long time ago not to allow ATC to initiate the SPECIAL VFR or CONTACT APPROACH clearance. Both of which are only available when requested by the pilot. Do you know why ? Let's hope someday the ATO will apply that same cause & effect philosophy to the creation of an
aggressive and
proactive tactics policy to save VFR (and not so proficient IFR) pilots from themselves.
"Also, you mention warning signs of "disorganized communication reflecting on an erratic decision making process and maneuvers." None of the audio in the linked file seems terribly disorganized to me, at least until after he issues the IFR clearance, and even still, it isn't all that bad."
"...it isn't all that..."
good either.
01:44 402: "Alright we're gonna deviate to the south to try to...ah...go around these and...ah...perhaps...ah...go through Barstow...Lance 402"
02:50 ZLA: "N402...Did you want to pick-up an IFR to Henderson if I could do that ?"
02:56 402: "Ah...yea...I would take that...Lance 402"
03:07 ZLA: "402 Are you ready for your IFR ?"
03:09 402: "Lance 402 ready to copy"
03:12 ZLA: "N402 now cleared to the Henderson Airport via Direct HECTOR H-E-C
...DIRECT...Ah...Correction H-E-C V21 to BOULDER B-L-D Direct
Maintain 1-5-Thousand"
03:26 402: "Roger...Hector...H...H-E-C via B-L-D...ah...15,000 Lance 402"
03:36 ZLA: "N402 are you turning northbound ?"
03:39 402: "Ah...Roger...I just took heading off of Bakersfield I'm gonna change it to the
current...ah...assigned...IFR
There are no waypoints named BARSTOW.
Was he referring to the airport ?
The pilot never mentions HEC until after the controller does.
The pilot never mentions DAG.
That sounds
disorganized.
The pilot is
NOT IFR qualified. (from the FAA Registry)
Why is he accepting the invitation from the center ?
That looks like
erratic decision making to the point of becoming Careless and Reckless ! 91.13(a)
Why the turn NORTH coming from RHV to BFL toward HEC ?
Was he unable to hold a heading while copying the clearance ?
SE to N is maybe 120°.
That looks like an
erratic maneuver.
What does "...I just took heading off of Bakersfield..." supposed to mean ?
The closest VORTAC to BFL is EHF (Shafter).
Shafter does not sound like Bakersfield.
Was he referring to something else ?
That sounds
disorganized.
"Missed readbacks occur all the time and in this specific case, HEC V21 BLD is more or less direct (I believe maybe a one degree turn somewhere along the airway) but I will agree with you, that is something a controller should hopefully pick up on, query the pilot, and at that point, it would make sense to me to have a heightened sense of awareness with that aircraft if they still have trouble communicating a correct readback. Now, I do not know the exact timing (specifically, how much actual time there was between each transmission on the linked audio) of transmission on this recording but when the aircraft makes an unexpected turn, the controller addresses that by issuing a heading and for all we know, he may have been considering him an emergency aircraft. At that point, however, there really wasn't much he could do; it seemed to simply be too late for that pilot.
You got (all) that right ! I believe LoC began when he attempted to copy the clearance, maybe followed by brief recovery, then LoC again down to the ground.
03:26 402: "Roger...Hector...H...H-E-C via B-L-D...ah...15,000 Lance 402"
03:36 ZLA: "N402 are you turning northbound ?"
03:39 402: "Ah...Roger...I just took heading off of Bakersfield I'm gonna change it to the
current...ah...assigned...IFR
03:45 ZLA: "N402 fly heading of zero-niner-five"
03:59 ZLA: "N402 make an immediate right turn heading zero-niner-five"
04:06 402: "Air Traffic Control (sic)402 MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY"
04:20 402: "402 MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY.........
(center blocks 402 with his next transmission)....."
04:23 ZLA: "N36402 LA Center...ah...Bakersfield airport is...ah...eleven o'clock and ah...
one-zero miles north-west bound"
"TL;DR I personally do not agree with your assertion that this situation is a great example of the failings of the ATO's training of controllers."
You are entitled to your opinion, as am I. Do
NOT take that comment as a SLAM. I acknowledge your effort in your post and I am grateful for your time and considered opinion. The purpose of these threads is to get pilots to THINK for themselves, to whatever extent they choose. The only good that can come out of this tragedy is to ask of ourselves: What would I do in this situation ? and What can I learn from this
latest example ? No one is obligated to post but by the number of views, it does appear to be a topic of interest to most and so I presume the questions are being considered. I encourage everyone to speak freely and post their comments and opinions as they see fit. We all benefit from the exchange of each other's ideas and perspectives.
"And one last thing, If I may...
You seem to have a love affair with text formatting. Formatting such as bold or italics is meant to enhance the reader's ability to read and understand your text by drawing the reader's attention to certain things. When you format as much as you have, it is actually QUITE distracting."
You have exposed my deepest secret. I am guilty as sin ! Managing distractions is what situational awareness is all about.