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Air Traffic Monitoring => Aviation Audio Clips => Topic started by: sunburn on February 05, 2009, 10:30:04 AM

Title: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: sunburn on February 05, 2009, 10:30:04 AM
http://www.faa.gov/data_statistics/accident_incident/1549/

Been released today.

All audio and transcripts are on the link.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: eppy on February 05, 2009, 01:01:52 PM
 :-( Thanks very much for the links, but wish the techies at FAA would understand that radio recordings are 'lo-fi' and can be saved as MP3 at low bit rate/file size. The recordings are ENOURMOUS.

They should look at LiveATC.net for best practice on how to do it  :-D
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: englishpilot on February 05, 2009, 01:33:13 PM
:-( Thanks very much for the links, but wish the techies at FAA would understand that radio recordings are 'lo-fi' and can be saved as MP3 at low bit rate/file size. The recordings are ENOURMOUS.

They should look at LiveATC.net for best practice on how to do it  :-D


Matey, you're talking about America.  Bigger's always better, right?!
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: ckleitsch on February 05, 2009, 01:36:31 PM
You can pick up the flight at 6:18 of the first clip (2025:51 according to the transcript) when cleared from 7 to 1500.
The brid strike call comes in about 7:56 into the clip (2027:36 transcript).
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: athaker on February 05, 2009, 02:08:09 PM
The cab audio also has a lot of action.  Gives you an idea of how many different people, airports, and services coordinated this emergency
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: wannafly on February 05, 2009, 03:34:01 PM
Here is a composite, starting with ATIS up through loss of communication.  My first post and edit here, but I've enjoyed everyone else's posts for quite some time.  Glad to finally be able to post something.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: SkanknTodd on February 05, 2009, 08:45:25 PM
on the cab coordinator tapes, the coordinator ends several communications with other people by saying "mike whiskey."  anyone know what that means?
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: w0x0f on February 05, 2009, 09:21:33 PM
operating initials.  required when ending landline coordination.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Acey on February 06, 2009, 11:00:26 AM
Cab coordinator is chilling audio.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: djmodifyd on February 06, 2009, 03:57:59 PM
operating initials.  required when ending landline coordination.

correct...although why he doesn't say "MW" i don't know
i just say "DJ"

Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: mkop on February 07, 2009, 11:54:40 PM
Why were only some of the landline communciations ended this way? (Unless I missed something, but I specifically noticed that.)
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: w0x0f on February 08, 2009, 01:29:42 AM
Why were only some of the landline communications ended this way? (Unless I missed something, but I specifically noticed that.)

Just my guess, but they had more important things to be concerned with than saying operating initials.  I can tell you from experience, you eliminate unimportant tasks when time is of the essence and lives are at stake. 

Stating operating initials can be eliminated on intrafacility coordination if certain technology is available.  It is still required on interfacility coordination.

This controller did a helluva job doing all of his own coordination with LGA and TEB under extraordinary circumstances.  N90 is critically staffed and can't always open the handoff positions which normally would do such coordination.  He was rewarded immediately after this by the FAA with a drug test.  I'm sure the FAA will also make note of the nonstandard phraseology, incorrect callsigns, although AWE 1549 answered each time, and the absence of operating initials on the landline calls to LGA and TEB.  That's the kind of appreciation he gets from his employer.

NATCA should nominate him for the Archie League Award. 

w0x0f 
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: BWilliams on February 09, 2009, 10:41:26 AM
Here is a composite, starting with ATIS up through loss of communication.  My first post and edit here, but I've enjoyed everyone else's posts for quite some time.  Glad to finally be able to post something.

Amazing ... CNN actually used a cut-down version of this composite for their broadcast. ( http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/02/05/1549.voice.recorder.tape/ )

I thought it sounded extremely familiar, and I listened to both at the same time, and the timing is right on between the transmissions, except for where they cut out certain sections.

Nice work, wannafly!
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: djmodifyd on February 09, 2009, 07:16:24 PM
Why were only some of the landline communications ended this way? (Unless I missed something, but I specifically noticed that.)

Just my guess, but they had more important things to be concerned with than saying operating initials.  I can tell you from experience, you eliminate unimportant tasks when time is of the essence and lives are at stake. 

Stating operating initials can be eliminated on intrafacility coordination if certain technology is available.  It is still required on interfacility coordination.

This controller did a helluva job doing all of his own coordination with LGA and TEB under extraordinary circumstances.  N90 is critically staffed and can't always open the handoff positions which normally would do such coordination.  He was rewarded immediately after this by the FAA with a drug test.  I'm sure the FAA will also make note of the nonstandard phraseology, incorrect callsigns, although AWE 1549 answered each time, and the absence of operating initials on the landline calls to LGA and TEB.  That's the kind of appreciation he gets from his employer.

NATCA should nominate him for the Archie League Award. 

w0x0f 
This is so true.  The FAA is just going to screw them....ive seen it before.

and i agree with Archie League Award full on
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: athaker on February 09, 2009, 11:31:08 PM
Why were only some of the landline communications ended this way? (Unless I missed something, but I specifically noticed that.)

Just my guess, but they had more important things to be concerned with than saying operating initials.  I can tell you from experience, you eliminate unimportant tasks when time is of the essence and lives are at stake. 

Stating operating initials can be eliminated on intrafacility coordination if certain technology is available.  It is still required on interfacility coordination.

This controller did a helluva job doing all of his own coordination with LGA and TEB under extraordinary circumstances.  N90 is critically staffed and can't always open the handoff positions which normally would do such coordination.  He was rewarded immediately after this by the FAA with a drug test.  I'm sure the FAA will also make note of the nonstandard phraseology, incorrect callsigns, although AWE 1549 answered each time, and the absence of operating initials on the landline calls to LGA and TEB.  That's the kind of appreciation he gets from his employer.

NATCA should nominate him for the Archie League Award. 

w0x0f 



Well stated. 

To put it more bluntly, the 160,000lb glider (I would hope) takes priority over minutiae.... this drug test business is ridiculous. I mean, look how fast these guys cleared airspace and pavement for the cactus...
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: cessna157 on February 10, 2009, 05:02:37 AM
Well stated. 
To put it more bluntly, the 160,000lb glider (I would hope) takes priority over minutiae.... this drug test business is ridiculous. I mean, look how fast these guys cleared airspace and pavement for the cactus...

You guys seem to be making a big deal out of absolutely nothing.  The crew was drug tested as well after the incident.  That is standard procedure after any type of accident or incident, no matter what the reason or outcome was, no matter who or what is to blame.

Any commercial pilot (121, 135, or 91) is subject to random drug testing at any time anyway.  Did I enjoy pulling my airplane up to the gate after a 3+ hour flight, only to be met by someone holding a cup?  No.  But that is part of the job, like it or not.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: sykocus on February 10, 2009, 07:25:30 AM
Well stated. 
To put it more bluntly, the 160,000lb glider (I would hope) takes priority over minutiae.... this drug test business is ridiculous. I mean, look how fast these guys cleared airspace and pavement for the cactus...

You guys seem to be making a big deal out of absolutely nothing.  The crew was drug tested as well after the incident.  That is standard procedure after any type of accident or incident, no matter what the reason or outcome was, no matter who or what is to blame.


Agreed...all par for the course especially in high profile incidents such as these. This isn't the FAA trying to setup a scape goat if the need arises. I'm not FAA cheerleader, but remember that they indemnify controllers for their actions on duty. So the FAA pays in a settlement even if a controller took 4 times the suggested dosage of sudafed for for taking position. In fact it would probably be in their best interest to no find out about such things. I think it's more of a DOT/NTSB thing though. Drug test are SOP train and ship related incidents as well.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: mhawke on February 11, 2009, 08:44:19 AM
Well stated. 
To put it more bluntly, the 160,000lb glider (I would hope) takes priority over minutiae.... this drug test business is ridiculous. I mean, look how fast these guys cleared airspace and pavement for the cactus...

You guys seem to be making a big deal out of absolutely nothing.  The crew was drug tested as well after the incident.  That is standard procedure after any type of accident or incident, no matter what the reason or outcome was, no matter who or what is to blame.



I have to agree on this one.  There's no doubt the controller's, pilot, flight crew, and everyone else did an outstanding job.

But you can always learn and perform better.  I've worked in the Nuclear Power Industry where similar standards exist.  If an event happened in the plant, once it was over the first step was to walk through it again and see if it could have been handled better.  That's simply a fact of life when working in industries and positions that allow for no errors.  You don't work the job for the glory that comes from doing the job right.

The drug testing is also standard in many other industries.  A truck driver hauling hazardous materials that gets rear ended by a sleeping driver at a stop sign, will have to immediately fill a cup.  Its standard procedure.  Or as you aviators would say, "It's part of the checklist".  Operational Discipline dictates that the checklist gets done the same way, everytime.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: athaker on February 11, 2009, 05:38:48 PM
Very interesting feedback guys, I appreciate it.  I wasn't aware this was protocol built into the positions mentioned, and knowing that it wasn't just singling these guys out, it makes complete sense.

I guess a better way to convey my opinion is that I hope all the people involved get due credit.  In a time when our country is in financial and psychological despair, due highly to the negligence, irresponsibility, or misconduct of individuals, this event brings to light those people that are still working hard and achieving. 

This, right now, is when we need heroes.  The positive actions of these guys, even if it was part of the checklist or thanks to the training, can go a long way towards reminding everyone else what good people are still capable of. 
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: w0x0f on February 13, 2009, 03:38:47 PM
Well stated. 
To put it more bluntly, the 160,000lb glider (I would hope) takes priority over minutiae.... this drug test business is ridiculous. I mean, look how fast these guys cleared airspace and pavement for the cactus...

You guys seem to be making a big deal out of absolutely nothing.  The crew was drug tested as well after the incident.  That is standard procedure after any type of accident or incident, no matter what the reason or outcome was, no matter who or what is to blame.

Any commercial pilot (121, 135, or 91) is subject to random drug testing at any time anyway.  Did I enjoy pulling my airplane up to the gate after a 3+ hour flight, only to be met by someone holding a cup?  No.  But that is part of the job, like it or not.

I have to respectfully disagree with you here.  Controllers are subject to random testing just like pilots, but it is up to FAA mangement to determine whether a controllers performance may have contributed to an accident or incident.

FAA Order 3910.1C states that "Only employees whose job performance at or about the time of an accident or incident provides reason to believe that such performance may have contributed to the accident or incident, or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident or incident, shall be determined to be subject to post-accident testing."  http://aviationmedicine.com/resources/files/PDF/FAA_Forms/Order3910.1CRevised_08_08_06.pdf

I am directly familiar with other accidents where deaths have occurred and the controllers performance was considered a non-factor and testing was not administered.  I'm sure the FAA mangers told this N90 controller that they were doing this to protect him, but I know whose rear end they were protecting.

Consider me old fashioned, but I still believe in the US Constitution and feel that reasonable suspicion is required before searching my body after an incident such as this where evidence indicates that controller performance was not a factor.

Drug tests piss me off.

w0x0f 

   
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Simcoe2 on February 13, 2009, 06:17:42 PM
Thanks for the audio.  The whole liveatc scanner enthusiast ring is great. 


Have you considered the possibility that 1549 never hit birds?  I'm not ATP, air traffic or associated with any segment of the airline industry, so any comment I say should not be construed as credible.  But the facts are what they are.   

This same aircraft and engine configuration endured a double high pressure compressor stall over Newark three days before landing in the Hudson.  The engines: CFM 56-5B with 5BQ software update are made by SNECMA and GE Aviation.  GE makes the compressor which have such a dismal track record of surge and stall failure that CFM and EADS issued emergency maintenance bulletins to subject all 56-5Bs to stringent compressor stall margin tests and replace any unit that failed. 

In December, 2008, an Air France 320 with CFM 56-5Bs double compressor stalled after takeoff from Tunisia.  In November, an Air New Zealand crashed in the Mediterraean off France for unexplained causes.  Throughout and prior to 2007 numerous worldwide operators reported CFM 56-5B compressor stalls.   

There's a mountain of evidence dating back to CFM-powered British Midlands Flight 092 that crashed just short of Kegworth, destructive vibrations that tore apart the low pressure compressor vanes in one engine before the crew accidentally shutdown the good engine, that CFM engines are over engineered ticking time bombs that sacrifice component weight and durability for power-to-weight and fuel mileage. 

Chesley Sullenberger, working the radios at the time, called mayday, stated aircraft callsign and the situation, but forgot to press the PTT. New York La Guardia Departure TRACON never heard the transmission. 

1549 was on the same Tower-instructed 360 heading climbing through 2800' to, upon Departure radar contact to 15,000', a 4nm straight line from wheels up, when whatever knocked out both engines happened.  Right here renders colliding with birds next to impossible.  That's asking two pairs of expert roving eyes to fly straight in to what they would've seen from miles off. 


Sullenberger's hesitant next transmission, with the 'aah' and 'uh' is a pilot bewildered by being instructed to fly heading 270 in a direction away from standard EOSID.  Asked to fly north of Manhattan instead of a 180 rebound around ORCHY back to rwy 22. He complies with the TRACON instruction while asserting his desire to return to La Guardia, though too late. 

The mystery is where the "Hit birds" came from? 

Waterfowl almost never fly at 2800' no less in a skein.  And even if they did, a seasoned crew would have a clear line of sight at any skein well above its typical regime and its sight and emergent situtation unmistakable.  Moreover, even if did defy all odds and hit a flock, it wouldn't knock out both engines at the exact same time and what happened.

Only electronics (or manual pilot input but the not the case here) do this. And the only factor that would cause ECM to shutdown the #2 engine simultaneously with #1 is sensors detecting grevious mechanical trouble, such as the GE Aviation designed HPC disintegrating in midair after application of low power setting, exactly as the emergency bulletins warned of.   

 



 
 

Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: sykocus on February 13, 2009, 07:30:19 PM

1549 was on the same Tower-instructed 360 heading climbing through 2800' to, upon Departure radar contact to 15,000', a 4nm straight line from wheels up, when whatever knocked out both engines happened.  Right here renders colliding with birds next to impossible.  That's asking two pairs of expert roving eyes to fly straight in to what they would've seen from miles off. 

The two pair of eyes had their "hands full" flying the plane. They were IFR. They're eyes don't need to be outside the cockpit looking for traffic. They need to be in the plane watching the instruments and running checklist, and they probably were. Also consider the closing rate. At the stage in flight when the incident occurred they were probably going close to 200kts. That's almost 2 miles every 30 seconds.



Sullenberger's hesitant next transmission, with the 'aah' and 'uh' is a pilot bewildered by being instructed to fly heading 270 in a direction away from standard EOSID.  Asked to fly north of Manhattan instead of a 180 rebound around ORCHY back to rwy 22. He complies with the TRACON instruction while asserting his desire to return to La Guardia, though too late. 


How you are sure his ahh and uh are have nothing to do with the fact that he just lost both his engines? The 270 is issued before the controller is aware of the situation at which point the controller issues a 220 which parallels the runway. He then offers runways 13, 31 and 4 to the pilot which all get turned down.




Moreover, even if did defy all odds and hit a flock, it wouldn't knock out both engines at the exact same time and what happened.

Only electronics (or manual pilot input but the not the case here) do this. And the only factor that would cause ECM to shutdown the #2 engine simultaneously with #1 is sensors detecting grevious mechanical trouble, such as the GE Aviation designed HPC disintegrating in midair after application of low power setting, exactly as the emergency bulletins warned of.   


My emphasis added. You seem very sure of those statements, how is it that the NTSB doesn't seem share the same viewpoint?

All-in-all I'm most confused about the motive behind the cover up that you seem to be advocating. Sure GE has motive, but what about the crew and NTSB why would they be trying to cover up a mechanical problem especially when it would be such an easy scape goat given the track record of the engines.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: cessna157 on February 13, 2009, 08:56:14 PM
babble babble

Simcoe2, you make a good arguement.....except for the part where you make your arguement.  Let's dissect the pertinent aspects:

You said you don't believe they hit birds and it was a simultaneous double compressor surge.  What about the passengers who saw, heard, and smelled the birds.  What about the crew that saw, heard, and smelled the birds.  Or the bird remains that were found in the engines and all over the airframe.

You said the pilots would have seen the birds out there while they were on their departure roll.  How exactly are you supposed to see a bird 4 miles out?  Then later on be able to see and avoid a flock of birds closing at 200+ mph?

You said Sully never pushed the PTT when he reported the mayday/engine failure.  Uh, yes he did?  It's on the ATC tapes that are posted in this very forum.  The "mayday" portion was cut off by the controller giving them their initial left turn.

You said it would be impossible to knock out both engines at the same time.  I ask why?  Surely the engines did not flame out at precisely the same milisecond.  But both engines flying through the same flock of birds at the same time, yeah, they could be knocked offline within a second of each other.

You said the crew kept flying ATC's instructions after declaring mayday which seemed to be vectors away from the 22 final approach course, which I don't necessarily agree with.  They had departed runway 4, so a 22 return is out of the question.  Initially the controller offers 13, which would be the easiest quick return, but Sully knew instantly (he is also a glider pilot) that a return to LGA was out of the question.

I hate to say it, but just about every fact (opinion?) that you gave concerning this accident is just incorrect.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Simcoe2 on February 14, 2009, 06:36:17 PM

How you are sure his ahh and uh are have nothing to do with the fact that he just lost both his engines? The 270 is issued before the controller is aware of the situation at which point the controller issues a 220 which parallels the runway. He then offers runways 13, 31 and 4 to the pilot which all get turned down.

The 270 turn instruction was issued at 20:27:32 Z by L116.  Four seconds later Sullenberger keyed the mic and declared "Hit birds."  I.e., instantly after L116's turn instruction.  Thus whatever happened occurred on the 360 heading while climbing to 15,000'.  And that's a straight shot. 




My emphasis added. You seem very sure of those statements, how is it that the NTSB doesn't seem share the same viewpoint?


The NTSB has no vested legal power to force any airline or manufacturer to do anything. 


All-in-all I'm most confused about the motive behind the cover up that you seem to be advocating. Sure GE has motive, but what about the crew and NTSB why would they be trying to cover up a mechanical problem especially when it would be such an easy scape goat given the track record of the engines.

Because the media create "heroes" to attract audiences.  The real heroes in this debacle were the flight attendants and ferry boats, with the first one reaching the left wing tip in a remarkable circa 4 minutes after splashdown.  The media made the pilots their chosen heroes when, in fact, if really did hit birds, were 100% at fault for losing all forward thrust and forcing the plane down.   

If you read the EADS and CFM bulletins, you'll see a different explanation that led to this forward thrust loss just as it did to the same plane three days before.  The motives by airline and component manufacturers to conceal flaws are as old as the industry itself and beyond.  It's human nature to conceal or maintain silence. In fact, the most pivotal design amendments to fatally flawed components were instigated by relatives of deceased passengers that literally stole the complicit evidence and manufacturer knoweldge of such from under the nose the culpable party(s).   
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Simcoe2 on February 14, 2009, 07:30:40 PM
babble babble

Simcoe2, you make a good arguement.....except for the part where you make your arguement.  Let's dissect the pertinent aspects:

You said you don't believe they hit birds and it was a simultaneous double compressor surge.  What about the passengers who saw, heard, and smelled the birds.  What about the crew that saw, heard, and smelled the birds.  Or the bird remains that were found in the engines and all over the airframe.

You said the pilots would have seen the birds out there while they were on their departure roll.  How exactly are you supposed to see a bird 4 miles out?  Then later on be able to see and avoid a flock of birds closing at 200+ mph?

You said Sully never pushed the PTT when he reported the mayday/engine failure.  Uh, yes he did?  It's on the ATC tapes that are posted in this very forum.  The "mayday" portion was cut off by the controller giving them their initial left turn.

You said it would be impossible to knock out both engines at the same time.  I ask why?  Surely the engines did not flame out at precisely the same milisecond.  But both engines flying through the same flock of birds at the same time, yeah, they could be knocked offline within a second of each other.

You said the crew kept flying ATC's instructions after declaring mayday which seemed to be vectors away from the 22 final approach course, which I don't necessarily agree with.  They had departed runway 4, so a 22 return is out of the question.  Initially the controller offers 13, which would be the easiest quick return, but Sully knew instantly (he is also a glider pilot) that a return to LGA was out of the question.

I hate to say it, but just about every fact (opinion?) that you gave concerning this accident is just incorrect.



Waterfowl ingested by a turbofan engine are converted to snarge in the blink of an eye.  A blood deposit, basically, splattered at high speed by still rotating fan blades, that's scraped off the engine's interior, placed in a bag, labelled and mailed to the NTSB for further study.  Pilots do not and cannot smell snarge, it being physically impossible, from the cockpit tens of feet away from the engines.  So let us scratch this dissection.

Bird strike remains stay on airframes in lesser regularity than humans hit by a car head on and knocked flying over the hood leave human remains on the car.  Only physical impact evidence typically remains, what with bleeding taking longer, and there's no physical evidence on any part of 1549 that any 8-10lb waterfowl collided with that aircraft as the photograph evidences indicates.   

Which passenger saw and heard a bird?  Would that be Mark Hood in 1st class (seat B1) who was chatting to female passenger to his immediate right in B2 at moment of engine failure? The trouble with this is that everybody else onboard heard a BOOM, consistent with a High Pressure Compressor surge like the same boom heard three days before.  Hood told the media that he was the second last to leave the stricken aircraft after Sullenberger, even gentlemanly offering Sullenberger "After you, sir!"  This contradicts his other statement of standing on the frigid wing for 10 minutes before rescued aboard a Hudson ferry.  Victims and purported eyewitnesses invent stories of fiction in the adrenaline-charged rush of media attention.  They claim to perform singular acts of altruistic heroism that never happened or could have.  And Hood is one.  Hood was fourth out that front left exit within seconds at flight attendant terse command and would've been thrown out by his ears had he not complied. Furthermore, people pay big bucks to fly 1st class to sleep in a dark, quiet, big comfortable seat. The odds of his window shade being open to see anything outside at the time are slim to none.  Once the boom, certainly.  Before, hugely unlikely.           
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: cessna157 on February 14, 2009, 10:30:53 PM

Waterfowl ingested by a turbofan engine are converted to snarge in the blink of an eye.  A blood deposit, basically, splattered at high speed by still rotating fan blades, that's scraped off the engine's interior, placed in a bag, labelled and mailed to the NTSB for further study.  Pilots do not and cannot smell snarge, it being physically impossible, from the cockpit tens of feet away from the engines.  So let us scratch this dissection.

Bird strike remains stay on airframes in lesser regularity than humans hit by a car head on and knocked flying over the hood leave human remains on the car.  Only physical impact evidence typically remains, what with bleeding taking longer, and there's no physical evidence on any part of 1549 that any 8-10lb waterfowl collided with that aircraft as the photograph evidences indicates.   

Well, yes, you make a good point.  The pilots are well forward of the engines.  So, yes, the pilots did not directly smell the birds.  Except for the fact that the pilots have air blowing in their faces.  Air coming from the air condition packs, which has air coming from the bleed manifolds, which is air coming from the engines.  So, yes, the crew and passengers did smell birds.

You say it is impossible for bird remains to be on the airframe.  I have no idea what your basis of thinking is on this.  I have had numerous bird strikes, none to the engines though.  I had a huge blood smear on the nose once, I had a dent in a slat with feathers stuck in the seal once, I had feathers and guts stuck in a flap track once, and back in my flight team days, I had an entire bird stick itself in my rudder cables of a C-150 competition aircraft.

I am curious, why is it your intent to sabotage this crew, these passengers, and this incident?  Don't you have anything to say about the ferry boat drivers that came to rescue everyone?  Why do you insist that this is all some huge conspiracy with the 200+ individuals involved here?
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: sykocus on February 15, 2009, 02:03:35 AM

Because the media create "heroes" to attract audiences.  The real heroes in this debacle were the flight attendants and ferry boats, with the first one reaching the left wing tip in a remarkable circa 4 minutes after splashdown.  The media made the pilots their chosen heroes when, in fact, if really did hit birds, were 100% at fault for losing all forward thrust and forcing the plane down.   

If you read the EADS and CFM bulletins, you'll see a different explanation that led to this forward thrust loss just as it did to the same plane three days before.  The motives by airline and component manufacturers to conceal flaws are as old as the industry itself and beyond.  It's human nature to conceal or maintain silence. In fact, the most pivotal design amendments to fatally flawed components were instigated by relatives of deceased passengers that literally stole the complicit evidence and manufacturer knoweldge of such from under the nose the culpable party(s).   

Your justification still doesn't hold water. Whether is was by birds or mechanical problems the pilots lost both engines. They did a great job and ditched the plane intact which resulted all passengers and crew surviving. They have no reason to try and hide the true cause of the engine failure because if it had been due to mechanical problems, the situation was just as much out of their control as a bird strike. Yet you propose that within hours of the incident the crew decided to hide the truth so that the media can have its heroes? Furthermore they were able to convince the NTSB to buy off on the story and fabricate 25 samples of bird remains to send to the Smithsonian. http://www.aero-news.net/news/commair.cfm?ContentBlockID=fb7d3a98-3140-4d11-a676-9d10adc48b11&Dynamic=1 All so that the media can have heroes and companies can avoid litigation. Sorry, but that is pretty much the definition of preposterous. Also you are proposing that the NTSB can not be trusted. If the NTSB has no integrity when it comes to an accident where no one died what more have they done in cases with large numbers of fatalities?
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Simcoe2 on February 15, 2009, 12:08:04 PM

Because the media create "heroes" to attract audiences.  The real heroes in this debacle were the flight attendants and ferry boats, with the first one reaching the left wing tip in a remarkable circa 4 minutes after splashdown.  The media made the pilots their chosen heroes when, in fact, if really did hit birds, were 100% at fault for losing all forward thrust and forcing the plane down.   

If you read the EADS and CFM bulletins, you'll see a different explanation that led to this forward thrust loss just as it did to the same plane three days before.  The motives by airline and component manufacturers to conceal flaws are as old as the industry itself and beyond.  It's human nature to conceal or maintain silence. In fact, the most pivotal design amendments to fatally flawed components were instigated by relatives of deceased passengers that literally stole the complicit evidence and manufacturer knoweldge of such from under the nose the culpable party(s).   

Your justification still doesn't hold water. Whether is was by birds or mechanical problems the pilots lost both engines. They did a great job and ditched the plane intact which resulted all passengers and crew surviving. They have no reason to try and hide the true cause of the engine failure because if it had been due to mechanical problems, the situation was just as much out of their control as a bird strike. Yet you propose that within hours of the incident the crew decided to hide the truth so that the media can have its heroes? Furthermore they were able to convince the NTSB to buy off on the story and fabricate 25 samples of bird remains to send to the Smithsonian. http://www.aero-news.net/news/commair.cfm?ContentBlockID=fb7d3a98-3140-4d11-a676-9d10adc48b11&Dynamic=1 All so that the media can have heroes and companies can avoid litigation. Sorry, but that is pretty much the definition of preposterous. Also you are proposing that the NTSB can not be trusted. If the NTSB has no integrity when it comes to an accident where no one died what more have they done in cases with large numbers of fatalities?


There are no impact craters anywhere on that airframe to suggest bird strike by 8-10lb waterfowl. 

8-10lb waterfowl ingested in a turbofan engine do not go BOOM, flameout, then silence.  (See the Thomson 757 on takeoff roll at Manchester in April, 2007 on youtube, two heron ingested in the #2 engine and what waterfowl do to turbofans)

1549 lost forward thrust on both engines simultaneously.  Bird strikes do not cause perfect simultaneous double engine shutdown.

The exact same aircraft and engines suffered a douuble HPC surge over Newark three days before. 

EADS, EASA, GE Aviation, FAA issued an emergency directive to all operators of CFM 56-5B turbofans in 2008 to subject their engines to a series of stringent ground tests based on a growing pile of operator complaints and replace any unit(s) that failed. 

The 56-5B, like its forerunner that triggered the crash of British Midlands Flight 092, grounding the entire 737 global fleet, is flawed.

The HPC cannot handle air volume intake under certain conditions and surges, destroying static and variable vanes. 

The manufacturer CFM knows this. USAir knows.  The FAA knows. The NTSB knows. Why they released the emergency directive.  The media just want heroes for sheep to say: What a hero pilot! He saved their lives! 

That's not what happened. And there's plenty of bird matter to back a fictitious bird story.   

 
 
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: iskyfly on February 15, 2009, 12:36:11 PM
please dont feed the troll on this one.
even though most his facts are wrong (there was not a simultaneous double engine shutdown), he is also excluding or choosing to ignore other facts to fit his conspiracy theory.

 
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: KSYR-pjr on February 15, 2009, 01:34:04 PM
please dont feed the troll on this one.
even though most his facts are wrong (there was not a simultaneous double engine shutdown), he is also excluding or choosing to ignore other facts to fit his conspiracy theory.

Agreed.  I thought trolls only existed in Usenet land, but apparently they stick their heads out in the sunshine, too.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: cessna157 on February 15, 2009, 01:55:30 PM
please dont feed the troll on this one.
even though most his facts are wrong (there was not a simultaneous double engine shutdown), he is also excluding or choosing to ignore other facts to fit his conspiracy theory.

Agreed.  I thought trolls only existed in Usenet land, but apparently they stick their heads out in the sunshine, too.

I think I am done with this thread.  If you wish to discuss it more, we can start another thread or you can always PM or facebook me.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Simcoe2 on February 15, 2009, 04:11:30 PM
please dont feed the troll on this one.
even though most his facts are wrong (there was not a simultaneous double engine shutdown), he is also excluding or choosing to ignore other facts to fit his conspiracy theory.

 

It's the trolls and their incredibly vanishing non-in-depth counter viewpoint/hypotheses.  Where's your copy of the Flight Data Recorder, the one permanently concealed from public access and scrutiny by U.S. federal law, just like CVRs?  Maybe you didn't know but all CVR and FDR tapes/transcripts released to the media are not the real McCoy.  They're copies made by a select secretive committee from, among others, the culpable manufacturer(s), and because copies, subject to inadvertent human error and/or deliberate error and/or omission. 1549s real CVR cockpit discussions have been substantially edited and whole tracts omitted from release and the transcript copy that was released contains minor errors and the audio massive omissions.     

Fortunately, these are unnecessary.  Waterfowl through turbofans do not go ‘BOOM’.  The 1549 #1 engine did at 2800’.  Three days before over Newark the same aircraft and same engines also went boom, only less severe and survivable.  That crew was able to restart and continue on.  Anybody notice any 'trolling' so far?  These booms occur when there’s no room for additional non-bypassed inrushing air in the business section of the turbofan engine. The air rushes in, can’t go anywhere since hits a wall of existing highly pressurized air and gets forcibly ejected in the direction it came through more inrushing air, whichever knots airspeed the plane's traveling, sometimes destroying static and variable stator vanes along the path.   

A 10lb bird snaps off a single fan blade that crashes into and snaps off other fan blades, etc, in a high speed progressive demolition. 

A HPC surge causes a massive boom.  A bird strike causes repetitive muffled sledgehammer on steel I-beam effect when sheared fan blades hammer into other blades.  A big difference. 

Had the passengers and attendants reported a repetitive THUNK-THUNK-THUNK-THUNK, that would be a bird strike.  They reported a one time BOOM, and that’s highly compressed air exploding forward out of the intake due to HPC design flaws. 

 


Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: joeyb747 on February 15, 2009, 09:05:49 PM
The "booms" you hear in those situations are technically called "Compressor Stalls", but yes, a bird going into an engine does not make a "Boom". It was documented in US Airways MX records that the engine did in fact have a compressor stall in the days prior to the accident. There is a big differance between a "bang", a "thud", a "boom", and a "bam". Granted, it may have sounded differant inside the plane, but I dont think the engines went "boom" when they incountered the birds.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Biff on February 15, 2009, 09:55:27 PM
I'm thinking the whole thing was faked on a soundstage, and all the "passengers" are paid actors.  If you look at the photos you can clearly see the shadows are all wrong.  And if you look really closely you can see "Hasegawa" printed on the side of the airplane.


Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: cessna157 on February 16, 2009, 12:34:24 AM
No no no, Slumcoe is partly correct:  There were no birds.  It wasn't a bird ingestion at all.

It was a collision with a UFO.  The blood and guts in the engines were from the Martians that came to colonize our planet.  The government and NTSB is covering it up to prevent worldwide panic.  The crew are heroes.  They saved the planet.  Will Smith and Randy Quaid, eat your hearts out!
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: fholbert on February 16, 2009, 01:22:19 PM
(http://i44.tinypic.com/vymxr4.png)

Frank Holbert
http://160knots.com
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: athaker on February 16, 2009, 05:44:44 PM
With all due respect, gentlemen, I think fholbert summarized the facts of this incident best with his last post...haha
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: iskyfly on February 17, 2009, 08:31:28 AM
NTSB Advisory
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
February 12, 2009

FOURTH UPDATE ON INVESTIGATION INTO DITCHING OF US AIRWAYS JETLINER INTO HUDSON RIVER


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The following is an update on the National Transportation Safety Board's investigation of US Airways flight 1549, which ditched into the Hudson River on January 15, 2009. The bird remains found in both engines of US Airways flight 1549 have been identified by the Smithsonian Institution's Feather Identification Laboratory as Canada Goose (Branta canadensis).
The lab made the identification for the NTSB through DNA analysis as well as through morphological comparisons in which feather fragments were compared with Canada Goose specimens in the museum's collections; the microscopic feather samples were compared with reference microslide collections.

A total of 25 samples of bird remains have been examined as of today. Additional analysis will be conducted on samples received from the NTSB to attempt to determine if the Canada Geese were resident or migratory. While no determination has been made about how many birds the aircraft struck or how many were ingested into the engines, an adult Canada Goose typically ranges in size from 5.8 to 10.7 pounds, however larger individual resident birds can exceed published records.

The accident aircraft was powered by two CFM56-5B/P turbofan engines.  The bird ingestion standard in effect when this engine type was certified in 1996 included the requirement that the engine must withstand the ingestion of a four-pound bird without catching fire, without releasing hazardous fragments through the engine case, without generating loads high enough to potentially compromise aircraft structural components, or without losing the capability of being shut down. The certification standard does not require that the engine be able to continue to generate thrust after ingesting a bird four pounds or larger.

NTSB investigators worked closely with wildlife biologists from the United States Department of Agriculture, both at the scene of the accident in New York City and during the engine teardowns at the manufacturer's facility in Cincinnati, to extract all of the organic material that was identified today.

###

NTSB Media Contact: Peter Knudson
(202) 314-6100
peter.knudson@ntsb.gov

 
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Simcoe2 on February 18, 2009, 01:38:31 PM
NTSB Advisory
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
February 12, 2009

FOURTH UPDATE ON INVESTIGATION INTO DITCHING OF US AIRWAYS JETLINER INTO HUDSON RIVER


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The following is an update on the National Transportation Safety Board's investigation of US Airways flight 1549, which ditched into the Hudson River on January 15, 2009. The bird remains found in both engines of US Airways flight 1549 have been identified by the Smithsonian Institution's Feather Identification Laboratory as Canada Goose (Branta canadensis).
The lab made the identification for the NTSB through DNA analysis as well as through morphological comparisons in which feather fragments were compared with Canada Goose specimens in the museum's collections; the microscopic feather samples were compared with reference microslide collections.

A total of 25 samples of bird remains have been examined as of today. Additional analysis will be conducted on samples received from the NTSB to attempt to determine if the Canada Geese were resident or migratory. While no determination has been made about how many birds the aircraft struck or how many were ingested into the engines, an adult Canada Goose typically ranges in size from 5.8 to 10.7 pounds, however larger individual resident birds can exceed published records.

The accident aircraft was powered by two CFM56-5B/P turbofan engines.  The bird ingestion standard in effect when this engine type was certified in 1996 included the requirement that the engine must withstand the ingestion of a four-pound bird without catching fire, without releasing hazardous fragments through the engine case, without generating loads high enough to potentially compromise aircraft structural components, or without losing the capability of being shut down. The certification standard does not require that the engine be able to continue to generate thrust after ingesting a bird four pounds or larger.

NTSB investigators worked closely with wildlife biologists from the United States Department of Agriculture, both at the scene of the accident in New York City and during the engine teardowns at the manufacturer's facility in Cincinnati, to extract all of the organic material that was identified today.

###

NTSB Media Contact: Peter Knudson
(202) 314-6100
peter.knudson@ntsb.gov

 




There were 18 turbofan aircraft hull losses from 40,286 reported bird strikes in the US between 1990-2006, says R.A. Dolbeer basing on USA National Wildlife Strike Database: (http://www.davvl.de/Volu%20englisch/2007/Dolbeer.pdf)

That’s 1 hull per 2238 bird strike, and vast majority small twin engine jets.  There were at least 120 million US commercial airline departures, 1990-2006.  Please, check and correct my facts as necesary. 

94% of these strikes, says Dolbeer, occurred on takeoff roll or "wheels-off" <100ft above aerodrome elevation.  6% occurred on departure (>100ft) or short final or en route.

There were approx. 10 million commercial airline departures in the US in 2006 (just under that in 2008), on back to about 6 million in 1990.  Or 1 hull loss per 6.7 million average departures from bird strike.     

Cactus 1549 is purported to have collided head-on with a flock of waterfowl over the Bronx in clear skies.  The only jet airliners on international record to collide head-on with a flock of waterfowl in ‘formation’ (not spooked into scattered flight during takeoff roll, wheels up or short final) took the flock by surprise at high speed out of a cloud bank. 

In 1995, on approach into JFK, a Polar Air Cargo 747 broke out of the clouds at 7500’ straight into a flock of snow geese that had no time to evade.  The collision caused significant airframe damage and knocked out ‘one’ engine. The crew reported a flurry of “sandbag”-like thuds.  (www.birdstrike.org)

Turbofans, even though regulations say 4lb, are built to withstand one-off 8lb bird ingestion. It takes two or more 8lb birds to knock out an engine. 

Departure (wheels up and initial climbout) is where most turbofan bird ingestions occur due to TO-power N1 in bird central congregation habitat. The odds of a turbofan-powered jet striking a bird in all stages of flight are 3000:1, and after beating these odds 33:1 will result in “substantial engine damage” and 44:1 that this damage will occur above 100ft AAE (Dolbeer).  Tall odds. 

Odd that have yet to factor in clear sky conditions, flight crew experience, skill and vigilence, medium full-time staffed radar, PIREP, passengers statements, and the remarkable little aviators themselves, the waterfowl.     

With Cactus 1549 the only twin engine commercial airliner departure to be downed by a purported flock out of all US departures between Feb. 2008 and Jan.2009 is a 1 in 10 million occurence.

The odds of hitting acutely vigilant waterfowl on full-time high alert for predators over the Bronx in clear skies are even taller.

Did I mention that the airline industry loses money on the whole, needs massive public subsidy to be sustained, engages in vicious price wars and exposure of potentially lethal component defects tantamount to catastrophic?

The odds of a predator high alert flock failing to collectively detect and evade a huge strange looking threatening bird bearing down on them from 4nm in clear sky are next to none.  As is no other airframe damage by 10lb birds at 180kts make.  Same for two birds per engine just happening to be side by side or line astern perfectly lined up in the path of each 1549 turbofan intake.  The combined odds of a first officer hitting an entire flock in clear skies from 4nm and the captain letting it happen, unthinkable.  The odds of TRACON radar plus prior departing crews not detecting these very birds in clear skies, just incredible. 

The odds of 149 passengers reporting solitary ‘loud BANG!’ against one saying ‘thud’, self-explanatory.  The odds of every passenger this very aircraft three before all reporting a loud bang then lights out, also self-explanatory. The odds of any passenger seeing any blurry object fly past their window in 1st class taking to co-passenger to their immediate right, forget it.  The odds of identifying this blur, even if did detect, impossible.  Only confirmation by labs like the Smithsonian can correctly identify, and I seem to recollect that it takes a whole lot longer than this unbelieveably fast test result to identity. The odds of smelling bird in the cabin, contrary to some passengers, impossible. 

Ingested bird is shredded and ejected in a blink. Whatever sidewall blood spatter remains is air-dried at the engine’s forward velocity, in this case, about 180kt.  Bleed air is drawn 'before' the fuel stage.  Bird remains travel so fast through the super hot high compressor air that don’t have time to combust. The only ‘engine-related’ contaminants in the cabin occur from faulty valve leak of lubricating oil, etc, requiring a steady supply over minutes, maybe hours mixed and diluted with ambient air from the ram air inlets to the parts per million point of humanly undetectable.  And why passengers get headaches, dry eyes without ever knowing why.  A bird goes through too fast.   

Even if I'm totally incorrect and 1549 really did it birds.  This crew bullseyed a visible and avoidable airborne danger,  therefore massive crew negligence at bare minimum.  Along with TRACON negligence not to identify an airborne threat in clear skies; no prior crew off 04 bird PIREP in clear skies; acutely vigilant birds to make no effort of avoidance with 4nm to do so; no compressor surge and stall by the same engines three days before over Newark, and a spotless CFM 56-5B operational history with no operator complaints.   

Just out of curiosity. How did the Brantus canadensis feather evidence stick around after an approx. 150kt inrush of Hudson River water, powerful enough to rip the #2 off, flushed through them on touchdown and yet left no dried blood spatter?   



Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: MathFox on February 18, 2009, 02:13:28 PM
Simone2, interesting theory... but I prefer to wait for the NTSB report with all the gory details. They have experts that will (did?) take apart the engines and will report on what damage the geese did to each stage of the jet. (And while the compressor can cook fan-sliced goose, I prefer goose done by a real cook.)

A few remarks on your story: A certified jet engine may stop all power production when a suicidal quarter-pound swallow is ingested. The certification only states that it isn't allowed to be a danger to passengers and plane when it ingests big birds. I won't comment on your use of statistics... just say "shit happens, despite all effort to avoid it in flight"

About the Canadian Geese: Fine the birds for not filing a flight plan, not establishing radio contact with ATC and not operating any transponders.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: delta092b on February 18, 2009, 04:01:53 PM
Regarding what a bird ingestion sounds like from inside a plane. Here is a good example:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=CA&hl=en&v=AzfEx_zBmek&NR=1

Sounds like a bang/boom to me and I don't hear many unusual sounds after the ingestion even with the engine at idle during the RTO.

Perhaps this was another cover-up :)
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: cessna157 on February 18, 2009, 04:41:46 PM
Check out this Martian strike

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgXkRgkHUk0

Now you tell me how they were supposed to avoid this.  Any they were only doing 75ish knots
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: athaker on February 18, 2009, 05:00:32 PM
I think someone should get William of Ockham a LiveATC account and let him weigh in on this.

(Google it.  You'll get it)
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: atcman23 on February 18, 2009, 07:29:07 PM
About the Canadian Geese: Fine the birds for not filing a flight plan, not establishing radio contact with ATC and not operating any transponders.

LOL good one.  Next someone will actually pass a law requiring birds to wear transponders.  Mode C intruders everywhere!!
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Simcoe2 on February 18, 2009, 08:36:19 PM
Regarding what a bird ingestion sounds like from inside a plane. Here is a good example:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=CA&hl=en&v=AzfEx_zBmek&NR=1

Sounds like a bang/boom to me and I don't hear many unusual sounds after the ingestion even with the engine at idle during the RTO.

Perhaps this was another cover-up :)

Listen to it again, it's three quick thuds.  'Three' rapid impacts.  BAP-BAP-BAP.  One bird can't do that.  Not even two. Cool vid.  The sound is a fuselage strike right on the plane's noggin by three birds all seen, or at least one, by the flight crew and why they aborted in such a hurry. (Or, dare I say, tire blowout due to frequency) They saw(heard) the situation unfold and aborted.  The left engine, progessively spooling up to takeoff N1 just before the thuds, would be just too loud to emit any acoustic indication of bird (tire explosion) ingestion and the wing too far back to resonate through the wing to the cabin, then up to the cockpit.  The video camera operator/passenger was situated well forward of the left wing/engine, and whatever birds (may have) stuck that departing aircraft never came into the camera's range.  Birds all right, the rubber kind, three of them, all bouncing off the bogie, with nothing going through any engine.  The pilots, being good pilots, immediately aborted, delivered a howler,  and returned to the gate for inspection.  Had it been an engine ingestion the crew would likely know.  All they're would be wings and claws.  The crew aborted so fast at about 120kt, below V1, that they had to have seen the bird or birds before any, if could, could've even passed through any engine.  But probably not what happened.  The sound is more indicative of high speed revolution failure of those circular rubber things.   
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Simcoe2 on February 18, 2009, 08:58:50 PM
Regarding what a bird ingestion sounds like from inside a plane. Here is a good example:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=CA&hl=en&v=AzfEx_zBmek&NR=1

Sounds like a bang/boom to me and I don't hear many unusual sounds after the ingestion even with the engine at idle during the RTO.

Perhaps this was another cover-up :)

Oh and, "A large eagle on the runway [folks]..." I love that!  Give this guy 10-10 for style and creativity. As if he didn't see the damn eagle right on runway, but somehow correctly identified its scientific animilia order and family after the fact. Yeah. 

   
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: cessna157 on February 20, 2009, 10:36:11 PM
Hey Slumcoe, I wanted to get your interpretation of the attached video I have.  From your previous statements, I will gather you will have 1 of 2 theories:

1)  It is definitely NOT a bird strike.  1 bird cannot do this damage.  It is just coincidence that the bird flew into the engine at the moment thrust was lost here.
2)  It is an intentional bird strike by the pilots as they must have seen the bird flying around the end of the runway, even as they got in the aircraft 30 mins prior.  They had plenty of time to see, identify, and maneuver away from the bird.


As for me, I'm sticking to my martian story.

Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: bibi on February 24, 2009, 06:59:33 PM
here is another video i found, done with CG

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=566_1235483062  (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=566_1235483062)

(no responsibility is taken for the correctness - just found it at LL and thought i should share)
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: big baz on March 05, 2009, 10:17:53 AM
This showed a display of Fantastic Airmanship by the Captain/CoPilot and Crew. I salute you Sully :-)
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Slick Willy on March 08, 2009, 10:16:54 AM
It is a true reflection on good training when everyone can remain calm in such conditions. There was a moment of dis-belief from one of the ATC's asked how many engines were affected by the bird strike.
You go Sully The Man!!!!!
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Infil85 on March 15, 2009, 10:14:45 AM
(http://i44.tinypic.com/vymxr4.png)

Frank Holbert
http://160knots.com

I just want to make it clear that those people in the life rafts are most likely not first class. First class was evacuated first for one thing. Second thing, I know for a fact that my grandfather, who was in first class and is 69, swam out to the wing of the aircraft.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: kea001 on March 15, 2009, 11:02:38 AM
"First class was evacuated first for one thing. "

Gotcha!  :evil:

Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Simcoe2 on March 16, 2009, 01:49:42 PM
"First class was evacuated first for one thing. "

Gotcha!  :evil:



All were evacuated in unison.  However, 1st class passenger Mark Hood's statement to the media of being second last to disembark is false.  As is his radio interview statement of seeing a blur outside the window. Hood, a Marine, was incidentally unable to distinguish starboard from port and had to be eventually corrected by the interviewer. Hood was also audibly nervous, uncertain and tense, when should've been elated to be alive and happily chatting without recourse or restraint.  He was rattling off claims that went against his moral character; i.e., that which did not happen.   

1549 is an excellent case study in what not to say and do from an ATC perspective, not to mention horrifically bad flying if really hit birds which is a crock.  The La Guardia Departure TRACON controller couldn't even get the callsign right, repeatedly addressing 1549 as "1529."  Oopsy. This aircraft wasn't going to make La Guardia, JFK, Teterboro or anywhere.  The only things an ATC can do in this situation is gather critical data from the crew, number of souls onboard, course direction, landings intentions and instantly relay this info to TRACON data to liason with the respective rescue units.  It's out of Departure's control.  The aircraft is coming down and about the only pertinent info Departure can relay to the crew is wind and verification of Ditch Switch engagement, which 1549 never engaged and why partially sank nor Departure advise.  The controller botched every step. 

Every crew, worth any ounce of aviating integrity, that takes off from La Guardia, has to have multiple emergency landing scenarios down cold before firewalling the throttles, so that there is no thinking involved should anything go wrong after V1, and these include unfortunate river rafting down the Hudson and prepping the aircraft for this very predicament.  The crew flubbed everything but the great water landing.  Sullenberger did not have any emergency landing scenario down at takeoff.  He had to ask La Guardia for possible alternate solutions before weighing the odds in midair, amid desperate futile effort to restart the engines, before solemnly realizing upon reflection that the Hudson was the only out. 

The only worthy representatives of Cactus 1549 at the Superbowl should've been the flight attendants and ferry boat crews.  Sullenberger and co-pilot should've been place kicked through the uprights for aviating conduct unbecoming of even Ernest P. Worrel in a body cast.         

Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: KSYR-pjr on March 16, 2009, 02:10:47 PM
The only worthy representatives of Cactus 1549 at the Superbowl should've been the flight attendants and ferry boat crews.  Sullenberger and co-pilot should've been place kicked through the uprights for aviating conduct unbecoming of even Ernest P. Worrel in a body cast.

Recall this famous quote, Simcoe2?

Quote
I'm not ATP, air traffic or associated with any segment of the airline industry, so any comment I say should not be construed as credible. 

That was taken from your first post here, which from how it reads was the only one that made any sense.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: mhawke on March 18, 2009, 09:58:00 AM




All were evacuated in unison.  However, 1st class passenger Mark Hood's statement to the media of being second last to disembark is false.  As is his radio interview statement of seeing a blur outside the window. Hood, a Marine, was incidentally unable to distinguish starboard from port and had to be eventually corrected by the interviewer. Hood was also audibly nervous, uncertain and tense, when should've been elated to be alive and happily chatting without recourse or restraint.  He was rattling off claims that went against his moral character; i.e., that which did not happen.   

[/quote]

Not sure how the passenger being a Marine has anything to do with him being able to distinguish starboard from port.  Many a Marine has spent a career without having enough time onboard a ship to gain that instinctive awareness of which side of the ship is red and which side is green.

As for him being uncertain and tense, I assume you have no experience in truely life threatning situations.  It is not uncommon to either have poor recollection after the fact because instinct takes over and you react, or because your mind simply does not want to deal with what has happened.  I have experienced both on board submarines after spening many years working and living on them.

I am also curious how you know that he made claims of things which did not happen?  Were you on board the plane?  Do you know what happened from his perspective?  Eyewitness accounts must always be understood to have happened from a persons perspective which can change everything.  For example, he may very well have thought he was the second to last person to embark because there was only person behind him at the door he left through.  Doesn't make him a liar, doesn't mean he was telling something that didn't happen, it just means that is what happened from his perspective, which is the only way he can tell the story.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: athaker on March 18, 2009, 10:43:39 AM
I think it may be time to stop humoring this guy.  Times are stressful enough...  8-)
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: cessna157 on March 18, 2009, 09:23:17 PM
Mhawke, you'll have more luck discussing the situation with your desk drawer.  Simcoe's responses will just make your head hurt
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Simcoe2 on March 19, 2009, 02:51:04 PM
The only worthy representatives of Cactus 1549 at the Superbowl should've been the flight attendants and ferry boat crews.  Sullenberger and co-pilot should've been place kicked through the uprights for aviating conduct unbecoming of even Ernest P. Worrel in a body cast.

Recall this famous quote, Simcoe2?

Quote
I'm not ATP, air traffic or associated with any segment of the airline industry, so any comment I say should not be construed as credible. 

That was taken from your first post here, which from how it reads was the only one that made any sense.



Peter, there's nothing famous to it. It's a standard duty bound disclaimer to alert any reader that, unlike yourself, I'm not claiming to be something I'm not. And they were my words. Not yours.

The irony is that people like you, who claim or tacitly insinuate being expert on all matters of aviation, haven't made any effort to explain how flying into a flock of birds from afar qualifies for the mantle of "Hero"?

Are you so desperate for heroes in your website administrative duties that you're willing to extol the title of heroism to a crew that nearly killed, if did hit birds, everyone onboard from near unprecedented, indefendible negligence with plenty of opportunity to avoid?
 
If you ever care to, then maybe you might also explain how these very engines that compressor stalled over Newark three days before with the cause never addressed by full replacement of brand new powerplants, the only repair option by manufacturer and FAA directive, somehow mended themselves without human intervention and recuperated to 100% airworthiness status in the ensuing 72 hours?   
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: KSYR-pjr on March 19, 2009, 02:55:56 PM
Are you so desperate for heroes in your website administrative duties ...

LOL.  You think I am the website administrator here?   Yet another mistaken assumption on your part. 

You admitted to not having any experience in anything aviation.  Thus, your comments, as per your own warning, are not credible.  I am just honoring your wishes.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: dave on March 19, 2009, 02:58:13 PM
This thread is about to be locked if this goes on any further.
Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Simcoe2 on March 19, 2009, 05:42:38 PM




All were evacuated in unison.  However, 1st class passenger Mark Hood's statement to the media of being second last to disembark is false.  As is his radio interview statement of seeing a blur outside the window. Hood, a Marine, was incidentally unable to distinguish starboard from port and had to be eventually corrected by the interviewer. Hood was also audibly nervous, uncertain and tense, when should've been elated to be alive and happily chatting without recourse or restraint.  He was rattling off claims that went against his moral character; i.e., that which did not happen.   


Not sure how the passenger being a Marine has anything to do with him being able to distinguish starboard from port.  Many a Marine has spent a career without having enough time onboard a ship to gain that instinctive awareness of which side of the ship is red and which side is green.

As for him being uncertain and tense, I assume you have no experience in truely life threatning situations.  It is not uncommon to either have poor recollection after the fact because instinct takes over and you react, or because your mind simply does not want to deal with what has happened.  I have experienced both on board submarines after spening many years working and living on them.

I am also curious how you know that he made claims of things which did not happen?  Were you on board the plane?  Do you know what happened from his perspective?  Eyewitness accounts must always be understood to have happened from a persons perspective which can change everything.  For example, he may very well have thought he was the second to last person to embark because there was only person behind him at the door he left through.  Doesn't make him a liar, doesn't mean he was telling something that didn't happen, it just means that is what happened from his perspective, which is the only way he can tell the story.
[/quote]


If you know much about "Marines" you'll know that they're amphibious infantry.  And if a person who calls themself a Marine doesn't know port from starboard, then they're not a Marine.  They'd never make it through the first week of School of Infantry. Can't go over the left or right side of a vessel if don't know which side is which. And to argue that some Marines spend their entire career not knowing left from right is an unbelieveable insult to the Marines. 

There is no instinct crammed in an airline seat.  That's a bit like saying Homo sapiens has flown for so many millenia that flying is anthropologically hereditary. It isn't. In fact, the more people fly, the more they tend to resent and fear it. If any instinct exists, it's moving at herd speed when the attendants start shouting to vacate.   

Eyewitnesses are the most unreliable possible type of witness.  This paradox has been proven over and over and over. People believe what they 'want' to believe; not what is.  The vast majority of humans run like no tomorrow from real or perceived danger. Never even stopping to look back and examine until satisfied of reaching real or perceived safety. After the danger subsides the fantastic personal stories of altruistic heroism emerge by people who want to be seen as heroic but in fact behaved completely human, running scared until the danger subsided. 

When one passenger claims to have seen a "blur" outside the 1st class window and to have heard a series of thuds, while everyone else surveyed said "loud bang" or "bang" then "silence," the statistical differential ought to be self explanatory. 

How does a radio station devote an entire piece to one passenger on a 100% confidential passenger manifest and acquire their cell phone number?  The guy called in. The station did not go looking for him.  He called them.  Why?  Because he wanted people from his neck of the woods to know that he was on that flight. That's he's not a nobody. Is different. Special, and for people from his neck of the woods to view him as special. That and an opportunity to get in good with his wife.     

When that plane came to a noticeable stop the attendants, having already advised all onboard, commanded all passengers to exit the aircraft without delay. You would be stunned what a 125lb female flight attendant can do to a 200lb boy that fails to comply.  Mark Hood was in that frigid water for minimum 7 minutes,  probably more like 10 since on the right wing.  Which means he was one of the first to exit. And exited closer to the front of the 1st class throng than those behind, nowhere close to the pilot in command, Sullenberger.       

Title: Re: US Airways 1549 Audio.
Post by: Simcoe2 on March 20, 2009, 10:33:00 AM
Are you so desperate for heroes in your website administrative duties ...

LOL.  You think I am the website administrator here?   Yet another mistaken assumption on your part. 

You admitted to not having any experience in anything aviation.  Thus, your comments, as per your own warning, are not credible.  I am just honoring your wishes.

Negative.  You're the CNYAviation.com website administrator.  The facts back my comments and, as already advised by fair disclaimer, for any interested reader to consult the facts on record and decide themselves.  Like the following: 

In 2007, a string of A321 worldwide operators reported compressor stalls by “highly deteriorated HPCs” in their GE 56-5B turbofans to GE Aviation (GEA), FAA and EASA. http://tinyurl.com/dayvv4 The engines on Cactus 1549. 

As the directive explains, GEA first reacted to the stall reports by devising engine software 5QB update to reduce the occurrence and severity of HPC deterioration on GE-powered A321s.  Then the stall incidents, after the 5QB update, reoccurred. 5QB was a dud.  So GEA issued a maintenance directive to all 56-5B-powered operators to ground test their units and replace any that produced EGT over 80 Celsius with a brand new 56-5B.  This means GEA wasn’t able to find a workable fix besides full replacement of a used deteriorated random ticking time bomb with a new random bomb should EGT (safely parked on the ground with no such luxury in midair) exceed 80C. Nothing novel here, once a design is flawed it’s next to impossible to reengineer once in production. Then an Air France A321 with GE 56-5Bs compressor stalled out of Tunis in December and the European Aviation Safety Agency and GEA released an “Emergency Airworthiness Directive” (2008-0227-E) on Dec. 23, 2008.  The original GEA directive, essentially, now EASA stamped with “Emergency” affixed. 

So that there is no confusion, the GE 56-5B high pressure compressor was rendered “Emergency” status by its designer/manufacturer.

The same Cactus 1549 aircraft with different crew double compressor stalled over Newark climbing up to cruise in Jan. 2009 three days prior to the Hudson regatta. 1549’s HPCs that stalled over the Bronx were the same units that stalled over Newark.  USAir didn’t replace these units, the only option by GEA’s terse emergency directive, both obviously and unmistakably deteriorated contrary to NTSB’s story of dud temperature sensor (Sorry, NTSB, a bum sensor doesn’t cause loud BANG with cabin electrical loss), with brand new 56-5Bs in the 72 hour layover. USAir put the plane and deteriorated HPCs back in service as is. Three days later 1549 took off from La Guardia, both engines stalled at 2800’ and the pilot glided down into the Hudson, and out waddled the bird story.   

The GE 56-5B line and Cactus 1549’s service record 100% undermine the bird story. Leaving only the matter of deconstructing the extensively edited audio tapes plus transcripts,  NTSB clown routine and media disinformation to explain how the fleece job was pulled off.   

GE Aviation sequestered 1549’s engines as soon as detached and/or salvaged and shipped them back to its Ohio headquarters, concealing the culprit HPCs. Not long after, the alleged story of “Branta Canadensis” “feathers” recovered from 1549’s engines emerged, as if any feather would loiter after a 140-150nm extended rinse cycle in the Hudson already riddled with innumerable detached waterfowl feathers.  USAir sequestered the two pilots in seclusion and imposed a media blackout. Then the spin doctors set to work transforming crew error which, if true that hit birds, would be monumental neglect, into “Hero pilot,” snubbing the flight attendants and ferry boat crews to focus on and idolize P-in-C, Chesley Sullenberger.  Then the spin went from the sublime to the ridiculous with a toweled off Chesley taking a bow to great applause at the Superbowl. No doubt each Superbowl fan and viewer personally received and read the GEA/EASA emergency directive, fully cognizant of the 56-5B disastrous service record, 1549’s double compressor stall over Newark, and magically rejuvenated temperature sensor which just happens to be backed up to redundancy and would never shutdown the engine even if all failed. 

Mark Hood’s story of penultimate to disembark the aircraft next to Chesley, even offering the P-in-C “After you, Sir!” is utterly impractical for several reasons:   

First: would mean the entire attendant staff, not just 1st class, and co-pilot were derelict negligent in leaving a passenger behind.  They were not. Evacuation was letter perfect except for some trying to grab their carryon.   

Second: Hood was outside that aircraft, drenched as all were in ankle- to shin-high frigid Hudson water or soaked life raft awaiting ferry rescue, for too long to be anywhere close in the timeline of second last. 

Third: No one in 1st class, including seat mate or Sullenberger, has corroborated his story. 

Many passengers were immediately interviewed by local media right after docking, still soaking wet, each ecstatic to be alive. Mark Hood, a few days later, was audibly aloof, tense, uncertain and nervous on a radio show that he contacted. Interesting.     

What would be eating at Hood? He has all the reason in the world to be happy, relieved, confident, loquacious, except wasn’t. Wound tight as a drum and taciturn at the onset and only loosened by the interviewer’s calming tactics.   

People fly 1st class, paying big bucks, to sleep in a quiet, dark cabin in a big comfortable seat with most on their way to a business meeting. Even most in coach(cattle) are trying to sleep as also on the way to a meeting. Even in cattle few windows are ever open during day flight in clear visibility. Attendants will even order passengers and sometimes boldly reach over to shut cattle blinds on even north side seats on a westbound flight so passengers can rest in reasonable darkness.

Hood will have it believed that his left side 1st class window blind, facing the mid-day western sun on a 360 heading, beating in on every big buck paying 1st class passenger trying to sleep, was fully open at 2800’ just in time to see a “blur” outside the window fly past at 200kt, then heard thuds.

Where are the pockmarks on the fuselage and leading edges supporting that claim?  There aren’t any. 1549 floating down the Hudson, as the pictures show, was pristine. 

Even if the window really were open, somehow escaping the vigilant notice and wrath of all other 1st class passengers paying big bucks to sleep with blaring sun in their face a la Hood looked after by stickler attendants, is only one step in a much bigger battle. Even if one were intently staring right out the window not blinking, all they’d see, if lucky, would be an instant fleeting unidentifiable shadow silhouetted by the blinding western sun. Hood, chatting at the time with seat mate to his right (his words) in big, wide seats that force one to turn their head right to converse, somehow able to stare right at the scorching western sun without  squinting. 

There’s a word for this and it can’t be printed here. Hood didn’t see anything out that window even if open, didn’t hear any thuds, and no way in hell was the second last off. He was aloof and nervous because was reeling off howling impossibilities knowing these to be impossible, adding Marine for credible austerity, yet repeatedly confusing port for starboard, suggestive perhaps of not a true Marine. Could be, but if were, would be most unique.   

While only speculation, Hood’s performance, while blundering, is a great opportunity to disseminate and hype the bird story for USAir and GEA’s continued customer relations benefit by pointing the blame at a next to impossible detectible blur, translating into Canada Geese, which NY TRACON and EGF4718 never saw nor anyone onboard either or heard, and the flight crew placed on the hero pedestal for conduct that would get them fired or sternly reprimanded by even Azerbaijan [Disast]Air.

Analysis of audio tape and transcription inconsistencies to follow.