Author Topic: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)  (Read 24671 times)

Offline tkibob

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KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« on: December 11, 2015, 03:40:33 AM »
KOMA   N145JR   17:49:06z   00:08:01 @ normal speed   00:02:45  compressed - see audio link blo

http://www.wowt.com/home/headlines/361447331.html

http://www.ketv.com/news/plane-crash/36898568

METAR:
KOMA 101652Z 30015KT 10SM FEW080 FEW250 12/03 A2967 RMK AO2 SLP047 :-D

1 soul aboard. :cry:

Significant transmissions:
00:01:10   5JR:     "My AHRS* have ah...ah miscommunication"

00:01:15   TWR:    "Meridian 5JR can you make a short approach ?"

My opinion:
Wx was not a factor.  5JR departs RW32R.  He reports an AHRS* mismatch.  This is NOT urgent or an emergency in VFR Wx. :-)  Terminating the flight and returning was prudent. :-D  The controller correctly offered this pilot a short approach to expedite his return.  Attempting a short approach while turning into your blind spot is always dangerous. :x  Airplane did a classic "DIVE & DRIVE" toward the runway.  I believe this pilot simply lost SA without having a good visual reference on the runway.  He descended too low while too far out and clipped a power line.:oops:  The smart move would have been to:

(1)  Decline the short approach.
(2)  Fly a normal pattern using the WET Compass.  (Do YOU remember A.N.D.S  &  U.N.O.S  ?)
(3)  Use the RW32R Localizer** for course guidance reference on the turn from RIGHT base to final.
(4)  Use the STANDBY Attitude Indicator in lieu of guessing at bank and pitch.:-o
     or
(5)  He could demand ONLY LEFT TURNS for better visibility back to RW36 or RW32L or RW32R.
(6)  He could demand a NO GYRO, Surveillance Approach to the RW of his choice.  (KOMA is Class C airspace.)

This guy had all of the available tools he needed and NONE (harsh, I know) of the skill required to use any of them properly. :-(

Moral of the story:
Always consider your Takeoff Alternates.    :-D
Keep Localizer frequencies handy or ask ATC.    :-D
Don't create an emergency when none exists to begin with.   8-)
Never loose sight of the fundamentals just because you have become intoxicated by all of that glass !!! :wink:
Never be in a hurry to do anything right the first time.  :roll:

*https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attitude_and_heading_reference_system

**I don't know what sort of panel installation this guy had to work with.  I use the L3 GH-3900 ESIS with rectilinear vertical and lateral deviation crossbars switchable between NAV 1 & 2 sources.  It is the best money can buy because, well, I think my life just may be worth it.:-D
(Sorry Mid-Continent;  Your SAM is just not good enough for my purposes.) :-(

§§§

What would you have done ?    How ?    Why ?

We had better learn from the mistakes of others because will not live long enough to make them all ourselves !

Your comments and criticisms are always welcome.
« Last Edit: December 16, 2015, 10:42:35 AM by tkibob »



Offline Sus_pilot

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #1 on: December 11, 2015, 01:31:45 PM »
How about "Look out the window?"

Offline tyketto

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #2 on: December 11, 2015, 01:45:49 PM »

If you're in an emergency, your first and main concern is to LAND THE AIRCRAFT. As a pilot, you should know this.

With that said, if your aircraft was having a problem, would you continue to fly the pattern? That is at least a 5 mile pattern, when you account for the turnout, downwind, base, and the shortest final you can accept.

Additionally, I know this airport personally (I was born and raised in Omaha). The left traffic pattern puts you over Carter Lake, IA, and a few hundred homes on both sides of the lake. While departing 32L would put him in the left pattern, 32R would not. So right traffic would be what he would need.

Third, as a local controller, Tower could easily have stopped all departures to handle this aircraft. which as a pilot, if you were in an emergency, would you accept a 15kt tail wind for final? If so, if your aircraft was unable to make the turn back in the pattern, would you accept that tailwind, and teardrop back into final for 14L?

Either way, it's easy to play armchair pilot and blame him for what things you would do, but you were not in his situation to know what was occurring on his aircraft to make the decisions that were made. So let's wait for the NTSB and FAA to determine what happened, okay?

BL.

Offline Sus_pilot

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #3 on: December 11, 2015, 04:19:06 PM »
I'm a pretty high time instructor that knows the G1000 system pretty well.  If it really was the AHRS, in VFR conditions, then it should have been fly the pattern, land, get it checked, regardless of the airport.  I've seen too many people get sucked too deep into the siren song of either a PFD or MFD for their own good, hence my comment.

 I know the Omaha area pretty well (I've instructed there some), and if it was a mechanical, then the open fields north of the approach end of 18 would have been a good option - at least what I would have taken.  I really don't care what the airplane looks like afterwards, as long as I'm around to discuss it. 


Offline tkibob

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #4 on: December 12, 2015, 11:56:19 AM »
Reply for tyketto:

Quote
If you're in an emergency, your first and main concern is to LAND THE AIRCRAFT. As a pilot, you should know this.

Loss of AHRS is NOT urgent or an emergency.  My first and main concern is to FLY THE AIRPLANE FIRST and then work the problem.  Rushing to LAND THE AIRCRAFT in your context is what we pilots refer to as:  "Yanking & Banking" and "Diving & Driving".  Coincidentally, as a pilot, I should know this and I do.  The NTSB archives are overflowing with LoC (loss of control) examples.  I teach from those examples and I will add this one to the pile.

Quote
With that said, if your aircraft was having a problem, would you continue to fly the pattern? That is at least a 5 mile pattern, when you account for the turnout, downwind, base, and the shortest final you can accept.

Absolutely, You lost me at "turnout".  I'm not familiar with that slang.  Do you mean UPWIND(or DEPARTURE), CROSSWIND, DOWNWIND, BASE and a STABILIZED FINAL ?  As stated above, FLY THE AIRPLANE FIRST is always the difference between making something out of nothing or making a bad situation worse.  Here is a quote from the AIM:

"Stabilized descent is a key factor in the reduction of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) incidents."

Sage advise to any pilot faced with the inconvenience of an unplanned landing and NOT an emergency.  "The shortest final you can accept" is always the fastest way to get yourself killed.

Quote
"...While departing 32L would put him in the left pattern, 32R would not. So right traffic would be what he would need.

Wrong. While LEFT traffic is SOP for 32L and RIGHT traffic is SOP for 32R;  Take a look at 91.3(b):

"In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency."

In lieu of declaring an emergency, pilots can and do use my favorite word in the P/C Glossary all day, everyday:

UNABLE− Indicates inability to comply with a specific instruction, request, or clearance.

Although ATC is considering the BIG PICTURE (all traffic, collectively); It is the PIC who has the "final authority" making it incumbent upon ATC to work around any unforeseen changes to their plans.  As you stated correctly, "Tower could easily have stopped all departures to handle this aircraft."   ATC exists to service the needs of the flying public.  Granted, pilots have the obligation to cooperate with ATC to the extent possible and it is usually in the pilot's best interest to do so.  However, no pilot in his right mind would ever allow ATC to substitute a controller's judgment for the his own.  Ultimately, the service being provided is a one-way street.  I know I have endeared myself to some controllers on more than one occasion with this question following a careless and stressed instruction:  OK Captain;  If you're in command of this flight, am I just along for the ride? OVER?...................................(long silence).......

Quote
Third, as a local controller, Tower could easily have stopped all departures to handle this aircraft. which as a pilot, if you were in an emergency, would you accept a 15kt tail wind for final? If so, if your aircraft was unable to make the turn back in the pattern, would you accept that tailwind, and teardrop back into final for 14L?

If I had an engine failure and the choice between landing straight ahead or attempting the "impossible turn" I will land straight ahead.  In this incident, there was no engine failure that I'm aware of, the Wx was VMC and no need to rush anything (there rarely ever is.)  So let's not confuse the issue.

Quote
Either way, it's easy to play armchair pilot and blame him for what things you would do, but you were not in his situation to know what was occurring on his aircraft to make the decisions that were made. So let's wait for the NTSB and FAA to determine what happened, okay?

"...it's easy to play armchair pilot..."  --  Correct, just like football fans who like to play QB from home vicariously through the TV.

"...and blame him for what things you would do..."  --  I do not credit him for anything I would do.

"...but you were not in his situation to know what was occurring on his aircraft to make the decisions that were made."  --  Correct.  However, this scenario has played itself out too many times in the past not to recognize the likely cause & effect, actions & consequences.

Based on the available information:

  • The Wx.
  • The communication with ATC.
  • The report of the AHRS issue.
  • The offer/acceptance of the short approach.
  • The eyewitness account of the airplane tripping over power lines.
  • The location of impact. (squarely in the blind spot/curve between downwind and base)

My conclusions are my opinions and seem reasonable to me:

  • This pilot had many and much safer alternative options available to him.
  • For whatever reason(s) yet to be officially determined, the end result is not in dispute.
  • It is not the first time this scenario has played itself out.
  • It won't be the last.

Figuratively speaking, a pilot does not "sit" on an airplane.  Either he is AHEAD of it or he is way, WAY behind.  That figurative location can shift from one extreme to the other in an instant.

There were no FARs, AIM, 7110.65, FAA or NTSB during the time of Orville & Wilbur.  It has taken the better part of 112 years of aviation for the organization, structure, details and procedures we work with today to come into being.  Unfortunately, most of what we know has come about in hindsight.  To be a responsible PIC requires education, training, proficiency and judgment;  All of which are continuously evolving.  Education is based upon past discoveries and judgment is about preparing for future occurrences.  My approach to training a student is to first teach him how to think like a pilot then he can begin to learn how to fly otherwise flight training is reduced to a monkey see, monkey do mentality where judgment is neglected.  The only good that can come out of these ongoing tragedies is to learn from from the mistakes of others.  It is the known facts within the commonality of these incidents that makes the initial conclusions usually quite accurate.  These incidents are a constant reminder for pilots to make the effort to study and learn something from them.  Apparently, not enough pilots are making that effort because they continue to occur.  Some people can choose to wait for a rubber stamped report on the matter while I have a mission to fly.

Thank you for your comments and criticisms.  We learn from each other by exchanging ideas and perspectives.  It is only when egos pollute that exchange that people become offended when no offense is or ever was intended.
« Last Edit: December 13, 2015, 01:06:19 AM by tkibob »

Offline Sus_pilot

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #5 on: December 13, 2015, 06:23:30 PM »

In this incident, there was no engine failure that I'm aware of, the Wx was VMC and no need to rush anything (there rarely ever is.)  So let's not confuse the issue.


A snip from a very thoughtful post.  Best thing I've ever learned and passed on to my students, from a very high time and wise UAL captain:  "If it doesn't kill you in the first two seconds, you have time to figure it out."

Offline InterpreDemon

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #6 on: December 13, 2015, 08:21:14 PM »
I learned the hard way, early on, to include the wet compass into my full scan at all times in any aircraft I flew, hence using one for guidance is like riding a bike. Why? Long, long, long ago when I was hot-shot, know-it-all student doing my first solo CC's, they gave me a ride off the line that I had not flown before but hey... by this time I considered myself "type rated" in anything from a 140 to a 180 (yeah, all three:-), so bring it on. I was flying the first leg, I think it was White Plains to Wilkes-Barre, by dead reckoning, and about half an hour into the flight and over unfamiliar terrain, I noticed that I had to repeatedly reset the DG. Figuring it unreliable, I flew the compass for a while since I was in the cruise phase, but the ground kept gradually turning beneath me and I found myself not only off course but uncertain as to how to get back on course without resorting to navaids (cheating). I decided upon one more check, flying only by the T&B, and saw that the DG and T&B were in agreement but the COMPASS was so possessed it was doing everything but spitting up pea soup. Once I wrapped a piece of duct tape over it everything returned to normal, I found where I was on the chart and three hamburgers and Cokes later I had completed my long distance CC.

When I got back to the FBO that evening, I said that I was positive the compass was bad, as incredible as that could seem, and the FBO owner's son laughed a good belly laugh, "Yeah, we know. That plane needs to be degaussed and Tom (my instructor) told us to make sure you got it for your CC."

Offline tyketto

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #7 on: December 14, 2015, 01:58:24 PM »
Reply for tyketto:

Quote
If you're in an emergency, your first and main concern is to LAND THE AIRCRAFT. As a pilot, you should know this.

Loss of AHRS is NOT urgent or an emergency.  My first and main concern is to FLY THE AIRPLANE FIRST and then work the problem.  Rushing to LAND THE AIRCRAFT in your context is what we pilots refer to as:  "Yanking & Banking" and "Diving & Driving".  Coincidentally, as a pilot, I should know this and I do.  The NTSB archives are overflowing with LoC (loss of control) examples.  I teach from those examples and I will add this one to the pile.

Quote
With that said, if your aircraft was having a problem, would you continue to fly the pattern? That is at least a 5 mile pattern, when you account for the turnout, downwind, base, and the shortest final you can accept.

Absolutely, You lost me at "turnout".  I'm not familiar with that slang.  Do you mean UPWIND(or DEPARTURE), CROSSWIND, DOWNWIND, BASE and a STABILIZED FINAL ?  As stated above, FLY THE AIRPLANE FIRST is always the difference between making something out of nothing or making a bad situation worse.  Here is a quote from the AIM:

"Stabilized descent is a key factor in the reduction of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) incidents."

bloody hell. Forgive me as it has been a long time since I've read the AIM word-for word, let alone kept up with the 7110.65 (last version I truly read was 7110.65T). I've had other things take priority in my life than flying and ATC.

Yes, I mean the crosswind turn. My apologies for not using exact phraseology; as I said, I'm rusty.

Quote
Sage advise to any pilot faced with the inconvenience of an unplanned landing and NOT an emergency.  "The shortest final you can accept" is always the fastest way to get yourself killed.

Quote
"...While departing 32L would put him in the left pattern, 32R would not. So right traffic would be what he would need.

Wrong. While LEFT traffic is SOP for 32L and RIGHT traffic is SOP for 32R;  Take a look at 91.3(b):

That's what I said. Read my post again: 32L would put him in the left traffic pattern. 32R would NOT put him in the left traffic pattern.

Quote
"In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency."

Exactly my point. Deviate from any rule to facilitate an emergency. So why would you continue to FLY THE PATTERN if you have an emergency?

Quote
In lieu of declaring an emergency, pilots can and do use my favorite word in the P/C Glossary all day, everyday:

UNABLE− Indicates inability to comply with a specific instruction, request, or clearance.

You're not telling us something we don't already know. So please don't set yourself up to be the authority on this. We have controllers and pilots here who are just as knowledgeable as you, if not more.

Quote
Although ATC is considering the BIG PICTURE (all traffic, collectively); It is the PIC who has the "final authority" making it incumbent upon ATC to work around any unforeseen changes to their plans.  As you stated correctly, "Tower could easily have stopped all departures to handle this aircraft."   ATC exists to service the needs of the flying public.  Granted, pilots have the obligation to cooperate with ATC to the extent possible and it is usually in the pilot's best interest to do so.  However, no pilot in his right mind would ever allow ATC to substitute a controller's judgment for the his own.  Ultimately, the service being provided is a one-way street.  I know I have endeared myself to some controllers on more than one occasion with this question following a careless and stressed instruction:  OK Captain;  If you're in command of this flight, am I just along for the ride? OVER?...................................(long silence).......

I'm not sure on what you're trying to say here, as again, you're not telling us something we don't already know. We understand that PIC has final authority over his aircraft. No-one is denying or arguing that. It is ATC's responsibility to separate traffic and fit any emergencies or other issues into his operations. Again, no denying that. So what is it you're trying to say here, again that we don't already know?

Quote
Quote
Third, as a local controller, Tower could easily have stopped all departures to handle this aircraft. which as a pilot, if you were in an emergency, would you accept a 15kt tail wind for final? If so, if your aircraft was unable to make the turn back in the pattern, would you accept that tailwind, and teardrop back into final for 14L?

If I had an engine failure and the choice between landing straight ahead or attempting the "impossible turn" I will land straight ahead.  In this incident, there was no engine failure that I'm aware of, the Wx was VMC and no need to rush anything (there rarely ever is.)  So let's not confuse the issue.

We don't know what caused this, so going the early crow and predicting what happened may leave you with egg on your face, so again, let's hold fire until the facts come forth.

Quote
Quote
Either way, it's easy to play armchair pilot and blame him for what things you would do, but you were not in his situation to know what was occurring on his aircraft to make the decisions that were made. So let's wait for the NTSB and FAA to determine what happened, okay?

"...it's easy to play armchair pilot..."  --  Correct, just like football fans who like to play QB from home vicariously through the TV.

"...and blame him for what things you would do..."  --  I do not credit him for anything I would do.

"...but you were not in his situation to know what was occurring on his aircraft to make the decisions that were made."  --  Correct.  However, this scenario has played itself out too many times in the past not to recognize the likely cause & effect, actions & consequences.

Based on the available information:

  • The Wx.
  • The communication with ATC.
  • The report of the AHRS issue.
  • The offer/acceptance of the short approach.
  • The eyewitness account of the airplane tripping over power lines.
  • The location of impact. (squarely in the blind spot/curve between downwind and base)

My conclusions are my opinions and seem reasonable to me:

  • This pilot had many and much safer alternative options available to him.
  • For whatever reason(s) yet to be officially determined, the end result is not in dispute.
  • It is not the first time this scenario has played itself out.
  • It won't be the last.

Figuratively speaking, a pilot does not "sit" on an airplane.  Either he is AHEAD of it or he is way, WAY behind.  That figurative location can shift from one extreme to the other in an instant.

Again, you are not telling us something we don't already know.

Quote
There were no FARs, AIM, 7110.65, FAA or NTSB during the time of Orville & Wilbur.  It has taken the better part of 112 years of aviation for the organization, structure, details and procedures we work with today to come into being.  Unfortunately, most of what we know has come about in hindsight.  To be a responsible PIC requires education, training, proficiency and judgment;  All of which are continuously evolving.  Education is based upon past discoveries and judgment is about preparing for future occurrences.  My approach to training a student is to first teach him how to think like a pilot then he can begin to learn how to fly otherwise flight training is reduced to a monkey see, monkey do mentality where judgment is neglected.  The only good that can come out of these ongoing tragedies is to learn from from the mistakes of others.  It is the known facts within the commonality of these incidents that makes the initial conclusions usually quite accurate.  These incidents are a constant reminder for pilots to make the effort to study and learn something from them.  Apparently, not enough pilots are making that effort because they continue to occur.  Some people can choose to wait for a rubber stamped report on the matter while I have a mission to fly.

I'm not sure what you are even getting at here. And for some reason, I'm not sure that you are even sure of what you are getting at here.

Again, how about we hold fire and wait until the investigation concludes and take it from there.

Quote
Thank you for your comments and criticisms.  We learn from each other by exchanging ideas and perspectives.  It is only when egos pollute that exchange that people become offended when no offense is or ever was intended.

The bold is something you may also want to examine, as your post does indeed come across completely egotistical.

BL.

Offline InterpreDemon

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #8 on: December 14, 2015, 03:30:04 PM »
Again, how about we hold fire and wait until the investigation concludes and take it from there.

Seems like a good idea, especially since there is a scarcity of facts available to us at the moment, such as the training, time, experience and health of the pilot, the cause of the "AHRS mismatch" he reported (there may have been other systems failures occurring at the same time), the condition of the equipment, etc., all of which will be examined in exhaustive detail. It would be a shame if all the arm chair captains here learned the poor guy had a heart attack as the situation migrated from routine to confusing in less than a minute.

He was piloting a slippery, high performance aircraft very reliant upon electronics for situational awareness, to have a glitch in that system during the takeoff phase would be at the very least disconcerting to perhaps all but seasoned test pilots, and as there are a few different ways the G1000 package can be stuffed into a Malibu panel we have no idea which backup instruments were available and where they were located. I have seen installations where they are down by the PIC's left knee, which is not the easiest place to monitor when you are taking off, at low altitude with traffic around and trying to keep your eyes on the outside world while thinking of and planning your options and actions... not to mention recalling anything you ever read in the AIM by chapter and verse, every acronym your instructors pounded into your head and making sure you comply with all aspects of the FARs.

Whether he did all that any could have done, made a mistake, chose poorly or otherwise was in "error" the only thing we know for sure at this point is that he paid the bill in full where the rest of us have not even received an invoice...yet.
« Last Edit: December 14, 2015, 03:34:10 PM by InterpreDemon »

Offline tkibob

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #9 on: December 15, 2015, 01:55:39 AM »
Reply for InterpreDemon:

Quote
"...especially since there is a scarcity of facts available to us at the moment..."
Say again ?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!  I must have vertigo.  The only lucid responses I can think of will get this thread locked for sure.  With over 850 views and counting in just 3 days; Locking this thread will not benefit anyone.  My comments are my opinions based upon my conclusions from the information available to us all:  

http://www.wowt.com/home/headlines/361447331.html

http://www.ketv.com/news/plane-crash/36898568

No one can please everyone all of the time.  I encourage anyone with an opinion to join the discourse.

Quote
"...the cause of the "AHRS mismatch" he reported..."
Cause ?  Who cares ?  Fly the airplane.  That question will be answered on the ground in the avionics shop.  Either the AHRS is working or it's flagged inop. with "ATTITUDE FAIL" and a pair of big RED "X"s over the Ai and HDG window.  All that matters is how the anomaly is handled and that comes with education, training, experience and proficiency in advance of the incident.

Quote
" It would be a shame if all the arm chair captains here learned the poor guy had a heart attack..."
Does the aviation world come to a stop every time an incident raises questions in need of answers that will come eventually ?  Do pilots ever learn anything useful from the known facts concerning recent incidents currently under investigation ?  I should hope so.  Unfortunately, statistics suggest not enough pilots are making the effort.

Quote
"He was piloting a slippery, high performance aircraft..."
That's scary.  Any aircraft can be described as "slippery".  It all comes down to the weakest link in the incident chain.  In this case it was:................tune in next year for the NTSB report.  Until then, we are all just speculating.

Quote
"...very reliant upon electronics for situational awareness..."
That only happens when first graders learn basic arithmetic with a calculator.

Quote
"I have seen installations where they are down by the PIC's left knee..."
Is that next to or below the knee ?  I would like to see that.  Please post a pic.  Perhaps you can find one among these:

https://www.google.com/search?q=meridian+panel+pics&espv=2&biw=1024&bih=655&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj56d-Zn9zJAhUGQiYKHUTFBq8Q_AUIBigB#tbm=isch&q=piper+meridian+panel+pics

Quote
"...to have a glitch in that system during the takeoff phase would be at the very least disconcerting to perhaps all but seasoned test pilots..."
Quote
"... not to mention recalling anything you ever read in the AIM by chapter and verse, every acronym your instructors pounded into your head and making sure you comply with all aspects of the FARs."
Don't forget the Practical Test Standards.

Is there any valid reason why any responsible instrument rated pilot should not or would not be proficient at partial panel skills starting with the WET compass ?  Again, the Wx during this incident was VMC.

This excerpt is from:
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§

                                                          FAA-S-8081-4E

                                                        Instrument Rating
                                                   Practical Test Standards
                                                                   for
                                          Airplane, Helicopter, and Powered Lift

          Emphasis on Attitude Instrument Flying and Emergency Instrument Procedures

The FAA is concerned about numerous fatal aircraft accidents involving spatial disorientation of instrument-rated pilots who have attempted to control and maneuver their aircraft in clouds with inoperative primary flight instruments (gyroscopic heading and/or attitude indicators) or loss of the primary electronic flight instruments display.

The FAA has stressed that it is imperative for instrument pilots to acquire and maintain adequate instrument skills and that they be capable of performing instrument flight with the use of the backup systems installed in the aircraft.

Areas of Operation:

VII. Emergency Operations.

Task D:  Approach with Loss of Primary Flight Instrument Indicators

References: 14 CFR part 61; FAA-H-8083-15; IAP.

Note: This approach shall count as one of the required nonprecision approaches.

Objective: To determine that the applicant:


1. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the elements relating to recognizing if primary flight instruments         are inaccurate or inoperative, and advise ATC or the examiner.
2. Advises ATC or examiner anytime that the aircraft is unable to comply with a clearance.
3. Demonstrates a nonprecision instrument approach without the use of the primary flight                     instrument using the objectives of the nonprecision approach Task (Area of Op. VI,Task A).
4. Demonstrates an appropriate level of single-pilot resource management skills.

§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§

All of that competence described above must be demonstrated WITH a view limiting device.  The weather in this incident was VMC.  The only instrument this guy would need is the WET compass and it ain't wired to nothing.

Demonstrating WET compass proficiency is a required task in the Private Pilot PTS.  I require my students to demonstrate proficiency before their first solo.  There is absolutely, positively
NO EXCUSE
(Heart attack; Not withstanding, TBD) for any pilot NOT to maintain proficiency to the standard of the practical test after passing a checkride.  Furthermore, there is no implied invitation to set personal minimums outside of the scope of the practical test.  (WET compass is an idiom for magnetic compass and it is now known as magnetic direction indicator in the PTS.)

Quote
"...with traffic around and trying to keep your eyes on the outside world while thinking of and planning your options and actions..."
FAR 91.103   Preflight action.

>>>   Each pilot in command shall, before beginning a flight, become familiar with all available information concerning that flight.   <<<

Planning for a takeoff alternate is generally considered to be included in the intent of that reg.

Quote
"...the only thing we know for sure at this point is..."
You are speaking for yourself and are certainly entitled to do so.

Quote
"...that he paid the bill in full where the rest of us have not even received an invoice...yet."
Now that is a beautiful metaphor.  You really did teach me something new today:

I suppose the "invoice" is presented every time we turn the key (literally and figuratively).
We can "pay(sic) the bill" in one of two ways:  with education, training, experience and proficiency OR with our life and our passenger's and anyone else on the ground who unfortunately, gets in the way:

http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/Funeral-Set-for-Sisters-Killed-in-Plane-Crash-219291611.html


Here is one for you,

A runway has 2 thresholds.  

Q:  How do you measure the distance between them ?
A:  In units of feet, yards, meters, etc.

Q:  How do you measure the distance between a challenge and a formality ?
A:  In units of _____________________

Feet, yards, meters, etc. do not apply.

HINT:  YOU already said it twice in your post.
« Last Edit: December 15, 2015, 10:08:28 AM by tkibob »

Offline Eric M

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #10 on: December 15, 2015, 02:36:59 AM »
Wow. Just.... wow.

Offline InterpreDemon

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #11 on: December 15, 2015, 02:45:20 AM »
"Wow" is right, and I'm not going to bite. One cannot have a discussion with one who is perfect, one can only be lectured to, and I have logged too much time over too many years to waste any more being subjected to that.

All I can say is that if I was in a stricken airliner where both pilots ate the fish, and I had to choose between you with your tablet full of regulations and perfect solutions to every conceivable problem, and a Midwestern farmer who had only seen a cork and wire for a fuel gauge the last forty years, I would pick the farmer every time.

Offline Eric M

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #12 on: December 15, 2015, 01:52:07 PM »
All I can say is that if I was in a stricken airliner where both pilots ate the fish, and I had to choose between you <snip> and a Midwestern farmer <snip>, I would pick the farmer every time.

Totally agree. I'm accustomed to this kind of know-it-all bravado in the comments at Aviation Herald, but LiveATC.net enjoys a much a higher level of discourse and camaraderie -- the sort typically found among pilots and controllers. (Emphasis on typically.)

Bob, you would do well to leave your ego at the door, and then review a dozen or so threads in these forums to acquaint yourself with the culture of this community.

Offline Sus_pilot

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #13 on: December 15, 2015, 02:03:43 PM »
What the heck, I'll jump in.  Assuming that it was a problem with the AHRS and nothing else, then there is no reason, none, for losing control of an airplane, any airplane, in VMC.  And, no, I'm not a super pilot or a test pilot or any of the other things mentioned.

Offline InterpreDemon

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #14 on: December 15, 2015, 03:04:06 PM »
We don't even know if he "lost control" before clipping the power line, which may or may not have been equipped with obstruction markers or otherwise visible to him. One eyewitness report sounds like he might have been setting up for the highway, perhaps due to loss of power or inability to manage it because he lost his display, and anybody who has actually flown turbine aircraft knows there is a big difference when it comes to power management vs some big old kick-in-the-butt Lycoming. Of interest to me is the fact there was no fire but kerosene was all over the impact site... turbines under power do not cool off that fast.

This was a 65 year old pilot flying more airplane than probably 90% of the alleged pilots here have ever dreamed of, most likely high time and not another "doctor in Bonanza" scenario. Unless you have personally survived real in-flight equipment failures, sometimes multiple, smoke in the cockpit, gear failure, loss of oil pressure, a blown jug in a Twin Comanche and even minor distractions during crucial phases of flight you cannot understand where I am coming from and will not until it happens to you... then you might start cutting the deceased some slack until you have the full story.
« Last Edit: December 15, 2015, 03:07:21 PM by InterpreDemon »

Offline Sus_pilot

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #15 on: December 15, 2015, 07:47:57 PM »
Um.  No blown jugs in a Twin Comanche (although I've had a carb in a Seminole do something interesting between the FAF and the runway) but, yes, I've had to use the "E" word a few times, along with a couple of requests for priority and saying "unable", in a variety of aircraft.  And I've had to keep students from killing me and/or bending the airplane (my favorite is the guy who tried to spin a Baron during a Vmc demo - I didn't know I could move that fast).


Again, the caveat is this:  with an AHRS failure in VMC, loss of control (or CFIT) should not be a question, regardless of the aircraft.  Other issues, I'll be open-minded.  I'm just rebelling against people saying that a loss of the AHRS in VMC is a catastrophe waiting to happen.  I strongly disagree with that.

If the AHRS ultimately proves to be the culprit, then I'd say, somewhere along the way, not enough emphasis was put on flying the aircraft in that situation during training.

Now, if the MFD was displaying odd readings, that did not correspond with expected power settings (going with the supposition that spilled kerosene automatically means a fire), that raises some different questions.  I could see, in the heat of battle, someone saying "Ahars" instead of "engine instruments".   

Another thought is that if the MFD or PFD died and the G1000 went into reversionary mode.  If the PFD fails and the attitude and heading go over to the MFD, along with the engine instruments, then I could, again, see someone saying there's something wrong with the AHRS.  However, that goes back to training - that should be a pretty straightforward situation, even in IMC.

Offline InterpreDemon

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #16 on: December 15, 2015, 10:39:40 PM »
That's all reasonable, and I DO agree that flying on backup conventional instruments should not be a problem in AMC (Any Meteorological Conditions) but just because we hear "AHRS" and "mismatch" in the same transmission does not mean he had black screens or red X's... it could have just been a software mismatch due to recent, improperly checked out repairs, some of those mismatch conditions resulting in loss of communications between panels and other symptoms. If you tune into the ARINC phone patch frequencies you hear pilots communicating with maintenance all the time with strange indications that cause them concern, and that's usually from the relative safety of cruise flight. It's a bit different when something starts blinking or chiming on climb-out.

We just don't know what he was looking at or dealing with at this point. One witness reported him flying along railroad tracks, then making a sharp turn and dropping the gear, before hitting the power lines, which does not sound like loss of control to me. Poor execution, maybe, poor decision (go back to the field) very possible, but he also could have flown "by the book" to a different crash site and suffered the same fate. I seem to recall a number of "experts" flying simulators claiming that Sullenberger could have made it back to LGA instead of risking all his passengers by ditching in the drink, which is blasphemy to the "never turn back" gospel. I suspect that if those simulators had been equipped with a pistol that shot the pilot in the head if he crashed their choices may have been different. You deal with what you've got the best you can and pray luck is on your side, and any pilot with a good amount of time and broad experience who is not suffering from narcissistic grandiosity or denial can look deep inside and admit that there were indeed a few times he was just plain lucky.

Offline Nukem

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #17 on: December 16, 2015, 03:25:47 PM »
To all of you...

I've lost a true friend...to this accident.

Someone who I've shared secrets with and deep convetsations about what life has in store for us all!

You see...today we will say our final good byes to the man behind the control's of N145JR.

So before you pass judgement on him know this about the man,
you are all commenting about...

Be it a "Pilot Error" or "Not"...who really gives a crap on what you all have to say!

And my impression is this so far, after reading these posts...

You are all smart individuals, with an opinion of what may or may not have happeend while in flight..

Yet it means nothimg to me...

And from what I've read so far...

Your are as you all say...full of Ego & Bravado!

As most pilots always are!

So with that said...

Your comments seem to lay blame on something you were not in control of, nor do they seem to validate what may of happened...

As you dont know the man behind the controls, as I do...

I have lost a very close friend this past week...

And as I go now with his family, to bury him this afternoon...

You should also know this about the man your are saying, made a grave mistake!

John was a Gentelmen and a very, very intelligent man!

As for his Education:
He was a Graduate of Iowa State University with a Degree in Architecture; A Certifed Underwater Dive Instructor, An Experienced and Seasoned Sea Captian, A trained welder, and a life long Pilot since he was just a teenager.

He was raised in a time of honor and respect by a WWII, Sea-Bee father and wife of 71 years in marriage; who taught him the sustained values of integrity, grit and a "Hold No Punches Attitude".

You see...

Before you attempt to smear his background and education as an experienced Airman, you should know that John was a man's man and would give you the shirt off his back, if it was needed.

So yes he was most definitely an educated man.

He was also a husband, a father and grandfather, and to those who were lucky enough to become his friend; he was un wavering in his love and loyality to you!

Not to mention, that he was also a proven professional, in the world of Business & Finance.

As a CEO, and owner of a company he built himself from 5he ground up.

As for his Proficiency in the cockpit:

He was a seasoned pilot; who understood the profession well; he too, like many of you on this forum constantly recieved training and hours of SIM time; that the modern glass systems of todays aviator requires...

To say it best...

John has probably logged more hours behind the contols of his Meridian, then many of you want a be's out there; have logged on your X-Box!

(My opinions here and sorry if I have offended you.)

But aside from that...

He flew his own plane with a passion, almost every week, like most of you would use a car, as a businees tool!

All the while...as he personaly meet with his clients face to face; as they were spread out all over North America.

Not to mention the numerous others he spoke with daily...at the small FBO's that he frequented throughout his travels.

And just to point out the experience slam made by a few...theses FBO's are located at altitudes your mama would be scared to fly in to!

Enough said...

Anyways, John, did this because he was trained to fly his own aircraft, as a pilot do continually throughout their life...

He was always capable of doing this...

One, because he could aford it!

And two, because he earned it...

By recieving the qualifications to do so in his own Meridian!

Lastlty, however; this man truly loved to fly and was always in control of his own destiny.

Because that's what leaders continue to do in America...

Especially those who were rasied in my generation.

We cut our wings young and work hatd to forge a path forward, so others will follow us!

But in the end...John just truly loved to fly, rather than drive.

And why not...wouldn't you?

If you owned such a plane?

Seriously, my world was rocked last week, by this tragic
news...and I have personaly questioned if I should give up on my quest to keep flying???

But I wont because I know deep down he would say this to me if he could...

"Never give up on what truly makes you happy, as life is to short for us, to not enjoy it"

I can hear him now...

"Keep on flying my friend...because it's what we do that counts and no one mans opinion truly matters".

Seriously though...I've had the pleasure of recieving valuable flight instruction from the man behind the controls of N145JR;

And on numerous CC runs; in all kind of weather; Snow, Wind, Rain, and Cloud Cover that was thick as mud...

So Low...That a visual option was all that I was praying for, while seated in the right seat of this magnificant airframe...

But low and behold, within a minute of landing...we dropped right out of the *hit!...

Grabbed a visual approach of Steamboats one lone runway and landed safely with now question that he was not in control of his airplane.

No sooner did we toss on the covers on and secure it down...and we were off as we hopped right into an awaiting car to experoence more of what the day would bring!

You see...this was a weekly routine for this man...and for many years to boot.

So Please...

If you all could leave the final Judgement of this accident, to the professionals investigating it; that would be the kind and compasinate thing to do here.

As Ms. Katie Petsky said to me last week; when she called me with information about Johns effects...

"Sir, when we arrived moments after the crash, his hands were found to be still on the yoke".

Rest in peace John....you will be truly missed by many.

Respectfully,

K.J.









« Last Edit: December 16, 2015, 05:28:36 PM by dave »

Offline InterpreDemon

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Re: KOMA N145JR CRASH - CLASSIC PILOT ERROR (imo)
« Reply #18 on: December 16, 2015, 04:32:13 PM »
Thank you very much, K.J.

It is good to know your dear friend John was the pilot I suspected he was, and was called home while doing something he loved to do.

Condolences to you and all who knew him.