Author Topic: Jetblue 1295 High Speed Aborted Takeoff at JFK  (Read 34872 times)

Offline tim.landscheidt

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Re: Jetblue 1295 High Speed Aborted Takeoff at JFK
« Reply #25 on: January 22, 2015, 10:02:58 PM »
To me it sounds like both voices read back the crossing clearance adding their distinct callsigns.  In any case, if the recording reflects what ATC actually heard, they should have detected the situation and proceeded with caution.  In the Tenerife airport disaster, (detectable) mangled radio transmissions were a major cause of the accident.

Offline InterpreDemon

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Re: Jetblue 1295 High Speed Aborted Takeoff at JFK
« Reply #26 on: January 22, 2015, 11:32:11 PM »
Exactly, Tim, and I suspect that the TC heard Redwood clearly with but a low heterodyne from 526 underneath. AM reception does not have the "capture effect" that FM reception does (where a signal 3-6db stronger can "conquer" the limiter stage and effectively remove the weaker signal) which is why they still use it for aircraft... unless the difference between the two signals is overwhelming (12-15 db or more) and/or the transmitters are within less than, say 20hz frequency difference you are going to hear evidence of a blocked transmission. It is easily possible for these signal strength differences to occur on the field (despite all the signals being strong) due to larger relative inverse square differences in (the comparatively smaller) distance of the aircraft(s) from the field receiver than with a receiver that is 4-5 miles away (in the case of the LiveATC feed) or 8 miles away as my recordings were captured.

For all we know the TC heard Redwood just fine over top of 526 and, as I said before, could easily have assumed the double (if he heard it) was somebody who had just been handed off by APP trying to get a word in edgewise and who would doubtless try again anyway. 526, not hearing any dispute from the TC after reading back a routine and expected instruction, assumed their read back was correct and proceeded as they thought they had been instructed. The only other unknown is whether the missing instruction for 526 would have been forthcoming had not the event occurred, but it seems to me that would have been a bit later than usual, especially when you look at the actual elapsed time between when 526 was cleared to land (#2 following traffic on short final), when the Redwood instruction was given four minutes later (and 526 was clearly on the ground or at the very least least on short final), when 1295 was cleared to go almost a minute later and when the event occurred 30 seconds after that. So the way I look at it, even if 526 had correctly heard and ignored the Redwood instruction they still would not have received any instruction from the tower at the very least for a minute and a half after landing and possibly as many as three, which seems a bit odd to me, whereas the Redwood transmission would have occurred right about when I believe 526 would have been rolling out.

The slightest change in any of the factors would have made this a nil event... if it was Redwood niner-niner, if 1295 had been on-time, if the butterfly on Agent Starling's lips had been able to flap its wings, etc.

Shvt happens, that's all.
« Last Edit: January 22, 2015, 11:36:06 PM by InterpreDemon »

Offline frcabot

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Re: Jetblue 1295 High Speed Aborted Takeoff at JFK
« Reply #27 on: January 24, 2015, 06:27:41 PM »
All this makes me wonder when we are ever going to switch to digital comms or some sort of digital atc order transmission for verification or redundancy. I know we do it already for clearances but I hope it gets expanded.

Offline InterpreDemon

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Re: Jetblue 1295 High Speed Aborted Takeoff at JFK
« Reply #28 on: January 24, 2015, 11:04:01 PM »
I hope it never happens. We already have an emerging problem with pilots' over-reliance upon automated flight control systems, and I know of no means by which you can digitally confirm that a pilot understood and acknowledges an instruction. How may of us simply click "I agree" to EULAs or TOS's and move on without reading them, even if they could be understood. So, you send a digital command to 526 to hold short, the pilot takes his eyes away from the windscreen to read it and then... if he agrees clicks "WILCO" and if he disagrees due to his emergency authority as PIC, he does what? Type a response? Click "NO" without explanation, or does he key the mic and say "That last instruction you sent I cannot comply with?" How quickly could the TC have sent that "1295 abort takeoff" command digitally and how quickly could it have been comprehended? Even worse, 1295 would not have even been able to hear that "STOP" command to 526, which is likely why they were already on top of the situation by the time the TC told them to abort.

No, there is a big difference between receiving a clearance and plugging it into the FMS, and communicating information required for immediate action or decision in a busy environment. Having many alert pilots and controllers sharing a common voice frequency in a busy ATA is the best way to assure the best possible situational awareness on the part of all the participants, and until the pilots are eliminated entirely I cannot imagine a better schema. When you look at the number of operations performed verses the handful of close calls, it's a no-brainer for me. Even in this case, in the end the system worked.

The next time you read a story of somebody who followed their GPS over a cliff, onto train tracks or (yes, it happened) across active runways at a major airport... imagine if they were pilots, or even four Air France pilots arguing with their on-board "HAL" as they flew themselves and their passengers into the Atlantic.
« Last Edit: January 25, 2015, 03:24:12 AM by InterpreDemon »

Offline GoodSpeed777

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Re: Jetblue 1295 High Speed Aborted Takeoff at JFK
« Reply #29 on: January 27, 2015, 01:35:06 PM »
Anything can happen in JFK...